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FEE SIMPLE OBSOLETE
Lee Anne Fennell*
Urbanization has dramatically altered the way in which land generates and
forfeits value. The dominant economic significance of patterns of land use
and the opportunity costs of foregone complementarities have made the
capacity to reconfigure urban property essential. Yet the architecture of our
workhorse tenure form—the fee simple—is ill-suited to meet these
challenges. The fee simple grants a perpetual monopoly on a piece of
physical space—an ideal strategy when temporal spillovers loom large,
interdependence among parcels is low, most value is produced within the
four corners of the property and cross-boundary externalities come in forms
that governance strategies can readily reach. But times have changed.
Categories of externalities that were once properly ignored by the fee simple
have become too important to continue neglecting. This paper argues for
alternative tenure forms that would move away from the endless duration
and physical rootedness of the fee simple.

Nearly all privately owned real estate in the United States is held in fee
simple absolute, or fee simple (FS) for short.1 Every law student learns that
the FS is the most extensive of all the estates in land—endless in duration,
unencumbered by future interests, alienable, bequeathable, and inheritable.2
Behind these descriptive elements lies the implicit normative message that
the FS represents the endpoint of real property’s evolution, a more or less
final answer to the question of how a modern society should structure
*
Max Pam Professor of Law and Ronald H. Coase Research Scholar, University of Chicago Law School.
For helpful comments, I thank Abraham Bell, Adam Feibelman, Eric Freyfogle, Thomas Gallanis, Paul Gowder,
John Lovett, Timothy Mulvaney, Shuyi Oei, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Michael Pappas, Jason Rantanen,
Meredith Render, Sally Brown Richardson, Ezra Rosser, Jessica Shoemaker, Lior Strahilevitz, Lea VanderVelde,
and participants in a University of Iowa College of Law faculty workshop and in Tulane’s Murphy Institute
Roundtable on Regulating Private and Public Property. Research support from the Stuart C. and JoAnn Nathan
and Harold J. Green Faculty Funds is also gratefully acknowledged.
1
See, e.g., JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW § 9.05(B)(1) (2012) (placing the
percentage of privately owned land in the United States that is held in fee simple absolute at “[o]ver 99%”).
Although the designation “absolute” is sometimes used to distinguish the full-strength fee simple from defeasible
fees like the fee simple determinable or the fee simple subject to condition subsequent, the term “fee simple”
without any modifiers carries the same meaning.
2
See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 214 n.7 (8th ed. 2014) (characterizing the fee simple as
“the greatest modern estate known to law”); id. at 218 (describing the fee simple absolute as “as close to unlimited
ownership as our law recognizes” and as the “largest estate in terms of duration” which may “endure forever”);
ROBERT LAURENCE & PAMELA MINZNER, A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 4
(1993) (“The fee simple absolute is the most complete form of ownership recognized at common law . . . there
are no conditions on possession, inheritance, or survivorship. The fee simple continues forever.”); Kevin Gray,
Property in Thin Air, 50 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 252, 252 (1991) (describing rights in the fee simple as “the nearest
approximation to absolute ownership known in our modern system of law”).
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access to land.3 This paper challenges that message.
Property is a mechanism for delivering access to resources.4 The FS
embodies a particular way of packaging and characterizing that access, one
that resonates with a “thing-based” property paradigm.5 It purports to grant
a chunk of the physical world—a unique piece of the earth’s surface and
atmosphere—indefinitely to the party designated as owner. This
formulation provided a useful shorthand for pairing inputs and outcomes in
the mostly agrarian society in which the FS developed.6 Over time,
however, it has become an anachronistic fiction that misses most of how
urban property creates value.7
In mediating access to resources, every property system must decide
when to employ boundaries that correspond to the physical world, when to
engage in finer-grained forms of governance, and—most foundationally—
when to simply ignore resources and impacts, effectively leaving them in
the commons.8 The optimal mix of approaches cannot be determined for all
times and places; it depends on which resources and effects are presently
most economically significant.9 Granting a perpetual monopoly on a piece
of physical space, as the FS does, is an unbeatable strategy when temporal
3
See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1316, 1398 (1993) (“As a group becomes
literate and its lands become more scarce, its standard bundle of private land rights tends to evolve from the timelimited and inalienable usufruct to something like the perpetual and alienable fee simple.”). However, Ellickson
notes the significance of different local conditions and acknowledges that “a private-property regime is not always
best.” Id.
4
See Lee Anne Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1471 (2013).
5
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012).
6
The development and ascendance of the modern fee simple occurred over a series of centuries, but the
watershed event was the enactment of Quia Emptores in 1290. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1376 n.308.
This statute, which prohibited subinfeudation of fee interests while allowing substitution, had the effect of making
land holdings more freely alienable. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 214-15. Heritability was
established earlier, although the date is difficult to pinpoint, and elements of the feudal system made the process
less than automatic. A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 49-51 (2d. ed.
1986). In 1540, the Statute of Wills made the fee simple devisable as well. Id. at 191. Entailments and other
impediments to alienability were addressed over time. Id. at 89-90; see also Claire Priest, Creating an American
Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits in American History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385 (2006) (tracing the
removal of certain limits relating to creditors in the eighteenth century).
7
There have been other recent complaints about the anachronistic nature of certain strains of property theory
and doctrine. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 101 IOWA L REV.
91, 134-35 (2015) (observing that Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith’s pathbreaking work “paid no attention to
public law, instead focusing on hoary common-law doctrines to the neglect of zoning, subdivision law,
environmental impact review, and other procedures through which agencies and legislatures impose ad hoc
conditions on development” despite the far greater modern significance of the latter); Joseph Singer, Property as
the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287, 1290 (2014) (arguing that “traditional legal doctrines governing
estates in land” represent a “hypertechnical, abstruse set of rules [that] appears removed from modern policy
concerns or values and increasingly lacks any understandable justification”).
8
Henry Smith develops the idea that property law employs a mix of governance and exclusion strategies in
Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. S453 (2002). The point that many impacts are best ignored follows from Demsetz, supra note 9. For the
idea that ignoring the impacts of resource related decisions amounts to leaving certain elements in the commons,
see YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 92-96 (2d ed. 1997) (explaining how an
“imperfect delineation of rights” amounts to “plac[ing] attributes in the public domain”). See also Part I infra
(discussing property’s choices among the three strategies of exclusion, governance, and tolerance).
9
See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS &
PROC.) 347 (1967).
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spillovers loom large, interdependence among parcels is low, most value is
produced within the four corners of the property (through crops or herding,
say), and cross-boundary externalities come in forms that governance
strategies can readily reach. But conditions have changed.
We now live in a deeply interdependent society that is overwhelmingly
urban. Eighty percent of the U.S. population lives in urban areas.10 Spatial
externalities are no longer confined to problems of wandering cattle or
wafting factory smoke; rather, the relative position and aggregate
configuration of urban space now represents the primary way in which real
property delivers and forfeits value.11 Spatially rooted estates of endless
duration deal poorly with the problem of optimizing urban land use because
they scatter everlasting vetoes among individual landowners over the most
critical source of value in a metropolitan environment—the patterns in
which land uses and land users are assembled in space.
These patterns have become too important to ignore, but optimizing
them over time requires a capacity for large-scale revision that the atomistic
FS cannot provide. Holdouts—and the prospect of holdouts—routinely shut
down socially valuable shifts in land use. To be sure, we have the brute
force strategy of eminent domain available to rearrange things when the loss
in value associated with existing land use combinations becomes
intolerable. But if the need for flexible reconfiguration has become the rule
rather than the exception in urban areas, we should reexamine the baseline
property estate itself. Our predominantly urban society calls for new forms
of property, ones that can relax either the endless time horizon of the FS or
its rigid anchoring to a particular map point.
The idea that property should adapt to match the ways in which value is
produced is hardly new or radical. Following Harold Demsetz’s analysis,
property should internalize externalities when doing so is worth the cost of
defining and enforcing the relevant property rights.12 A corollary to this
10
U.S. Census Bureau Newsroom, Growth in Urban Population Outpaces Rest of Nation, Census Bureau
Reports (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb12-50.html
(reporting, based on data from the 2010 Census, that “[u]rban areas — defined as densely developed residential,
commercial and other nonresidential areas -- now account for 80.7 percent of the U.S. population, up from 79.0
percent in 2000”). In 1790, the figure was 5.1 percent. U.S. Census Bureau, Population: 1790 to 1990, United
States, Urban and Rural, http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/table-4.pdf. The Census Bureau began
using a new definition of “urban” in 1950, which somewhat increased (in that year, from 59.6 to 64.0) the
percentage reported as falling in that category. Id; see also U.S. Census Bureau, History: Urban and Rural Areas
http://www.census.gov/history/www/programs/geography/urban_and_rural_areas.html (detailing definitional
changes over the years in the meaning of “urban”). Urbanization is a worldwide phenomenon. See United
Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2014 Revision of the World
Urbanization Prospects, Highlights 1 (2014), available at http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Highlights/WUP2014Highlights.pdf (reporting that “54 per cent of the world’s population resid[es] in urban areas in 2014 . . . . and by
2050, 66 per cent of the world’s population is projected to be urban.”).
11
HUGH STRETTON, URBAN PLANNING IN RICH AND POOR COUNTRIES (1978) (“Urban land gets most of its
market value not from its physical nature or its owner’s outlays, but from the presence of other people and private
investments around it.”).
12
See Demsetz, supra note 9, at 350.
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principle is that property’s boundaries—the primary technology it uses for
internalizing externalities—should change if the costs or benefits of
maintaining those boundaries change. And there is a long history of
property doing exactly that. When commercial air travel became an
important generator of value, the previously harmless conceit that
landowners owned to the heavens suddenly became too expensive to
countenance, and estates were revised accordingly.13
Similarly, urbanization has raised the costs and lowered the benefits of
granting individual owners perpetual monopolies on rooted fragments of
space. What were once nearly stand-alone production sites have now
become integral parts of a dynamic, interdependent, urban value-production
machine.14 Markets cannot accomplish shifts from less valuable to more
valuable urban configurations because of the need to synchronize many
complementary changes at one time. Yet the land use controls that have
emerged in an effort to manage interdependencies are not designed to
facilitate these sorts of large-scale coordinated moves. Indeed, they are not
even well-designed to harness information about the relative values of
different land uses at the parcel level.
It is becoming increasingly evident that current methods of managing
urban land use carry a tremendous opportunity cost. A recent article
estimated that “[l]ifting all the barriers to urban growth in America could
raise the country’s GDP by between 6.5% and 13.5%, or by about $1
trillion-$2 trillion.”15 Unlocking the potential of urban land requires
shedding not only regulatory impediments, however, but also impediments
that are built into the very fabric of our dominant tenure form. To capture
more value from urban land use patterns will require creative thinking,
including a willingness to rethink the rooted, perpetual nature of standard13
Eric Claeys has recently questioned whether property owners ever held an absolute right to the airspace far
above their properties, suggesting instead that the ad coelum doctrine served as “one of several heuristics” that
were aimed at giving owners rights over areas that they could feasibly put to beneficial use. Eric R. Claeys, On the
Use and Abuse of Overflight Column Doctrine, 2 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROPERTY RIGHTS CONF. J. 61, 63, 79-82
(2013). Regardless, the history suggests that commercial overflights raised a question that had to be resolved
about the landowners’ rights. See id. at 62 (“No doubt, there was a period of time when landowners, airlines, and
lawyers were all genuinely in suspense about how airplane overflights would be treated at common law.”); see
generally STUART BANNER, WHO OWNS THE SKY (2008) (providing a thorough history of the overflight issue’s
development and resolution). It matters little for my purposes whether one understands the resolution of that
question as a recognition of how things had always really been or as an announcement of a change. Perhaps future
generations will point to the use of eminent domain—or even to reforms like the ones that this paper hopes to
foreshadow—as proof that the FS never really granted perpetual estates, but rather only contingent ones.
14
In a sense, real property has come to more closely resemble intellectual property in its modalities of value
production, insofar as both now substantially rely on agglomeration economies and the ability to capture
interdependencies. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 26871 (2007) (describing spillovers among geographically clustered high-tech firms and their positive effect on
innovation). Real property theory might therefore take a lesson from intellectual property scholars’ active
engagement with the length and character of the monopolies granted. This inverts the usual focus on what, if
anything, intellectual property can learn from real property—and the associated concern that intellectual property
is too overshadowed by or beholden to real property metaphors.. See Julie E. Cohen, Property as Institutions for
Resources: Lessons From and for IP, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2015) .
15
Space and the City, The Economist, April 4, 2015.
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issue property rights.
There are two basic ways in which our current property system falls
short in meeting the challenges of the city. First, we lack good mechanisms
for coordinating the spillover-producing behaviors that are most important
in urban agglomerations. Second, the veto power granted to owners
hampers the ability to reconfigure property at a different scale or with
different sets of complementary uses. Although the two issues—
coordination and configuration—are entwined,16 my primary focus in this
paper is on finding ways to overcome reconfiguration challenges.
Configuration—getting the value-maximizing combination of land uses and
land users in place—is a prerequisite to meaningful coordination efforts.17
And it is here that the architecture of the FS most plainly gets in the way.
To provoke thought, I briefly sketch two possibilities for revising the FS
to make it more readily reconfigurable. The first, the callable fee, is a tenure
form that is made expressly subject to a call option that can be exercised as
to all properties in a designated area when particular conditions obtain.18
The second, the floating fee, would represent a geographically untethered
claim on real property that would facilitate either small-scale readjustment
or longer-range relocations.19 Both would loosen the spatial monopoly that
the FS grants to individual landowners in urban areas.
The paper proceeds in three steps. Part I presents property as a dynamic
institution that employs a shifting mix of three strategies: boundary
exclusion, governance of spillovers, and toleration of externalities. Part II
considers how we might remake property forms to better fit the way urban
landscapes produce value. Part III addresses a variety of objections,
16
Significantly, it may be difficult to know whether a reconfiguration will add value if the set of landowners
who are currently present are not successfully coordinating with each other to optimize their combined land uses.
I consider the possibility that some reconfiguration tools could double as incentive mechanisms that would lead
neighboring landowners to develop more effective methods of coordination. See text accompanying notes __
infra.
17
Potential mechanisms for coordinating the behavior of neighboring urban land users might draw on
existing approaches for managing large-scale natural resources. See, e.g., Karen Bradshaw Schulz & Dean Lueck,
Contracting for Control of Landscape-Level Resources, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2507 (2015) (examining management
alternatives for landscape-level resources, from habitats to firescapes, which exist at a scale far larger than that
used for ordinary productive activities on land). Oil unitization similarly structures coordination among adjacent
landowners whose efficient scale of ownership is smaller than the oil reserve than underlies their parcels. See
Gary D. Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW
142 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003) (describing oil unitization arrangements).
18
See infra Part II.B.2. Of course, the government has an implicit call option on everyone’s property already
by virtue of the eminent domain power; what is contemplated here is a more explicit option that would price in
heightened vulnerability to displacement. The “callable” terminology comes from the language of financial
options. In finance, a call option provides the right but not the obligation to purchase a particular stock or other
asset at a particular price on or by a particular date. E.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 503–05 (10th ed. 2011). In the legal literature on entitlements, liability rules have been
equated with call options. See IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW 14–17 (2005) (reviewing development of option
analogy in legal scholarship). The property rule-liability rule dichotomy was famously developed in Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
19
See infra Part II.B.C.
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including concerns that the ideas proposed here would run afoul of the
numerus clausus doctrine or otherwise undermine the meaning of property.
In fact, the approaches I discuss could be constructed from existing property
forms—defeasible estates and executory interests—and designed to support
an enhanced rather than diminished vision of ownership.
To be clear, I do not argue that the FS should be abolished, nor do I
dispute that it will continue to be the best tenure form in many situations.
But it should not be treated as the only alternative, nor should its costs be
ignored.
I. ARCHITECTURE AND ADAPTATION
Property’s architecture has received significant scholarly attention,20 as
has the proposition that property can or should adapt over time in response
to social and economic shocks.21 In this Part, I use these ideas to lay the
groundwork for a critique of the FS. I start by locating the FS’s design
choices within the framework of architectural decisions that property must
make as a general matter. I then turn to questions of adaptation.
A. Property Design: An Overview
Property is designed to deliver access to resources in ways that will
induce investment.22 To do this, property pursues a set of strategies for
matching up inputs and outcomes. As Henry Smith has emphasized, real
property characteristically proceeds by placing a boundary around a
resource and allowing those designated as owners to exclude others from
the benefit stream that is produced within those boundaries.23 By delegating
control over the demarcated resource, property allows owners to make and
collect on investments or bets that play out within that domain.24 Ideally,
the boundaries would be well-scaled (in both time and space) to fit the
primary activities occurring on a given parcel, so as to at least roughly
20
Henry Smith’s work is perhaps the best known in this vein. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 5, at 1699 (“There
is a basic architecture of property, and many features of property follow from it.”). Smith conceives of property as
a modular, exclusion-based system, albeit one that is supplemented with governance mechanisms. See id.
Notably, he rejects the bundle of rights understanding of property, as he has also done in joint work with Thomas
Merrill. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property as Modularity, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 151 (2012) (describing the
architectural claims that he and Smith have made jointly and discussing and critiquing Smith’s modularity
approach).
21
The seminal paper on this topic is Demsetz, supra note 9. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The
Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331, S331 (2002) (describing
Demsetz’s article as “[t]he point of departure for virtually all efforts to explain changes in property rights”). For a
recent evolutionary account, see Lee Alston & Bernardo Mueller, Towards a More Evolutionary Theory of
Property Rights, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2255 (2015).
22
See e.g., Fennell, supra note 4, at 1498-1500; Gray, supra note 2, at 304-05.
23
Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1753–56 (2004) (describing
property’s “exclusion strategy”).
24
Id. at 1729.
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internalize the associated costs and benefits.25
As Smith recognizes, this “exclusion strategy” is insufficient on its own
to properly align incentives.26 Activities taking place within the boundaries
will often produce spillovers, both negative and positive, for proximate
others.27 Where boundaries cannot feasibly or cost-effectively be
employed,28 some form of governance may be used instead to adjust the
payoffs around the edges of the property’s boundaries.29 Zoning, covenants,
and nuisance law represent common forms of governance in the land use
arena, although more complex schemes might grant parties stakes in
particular outcomes or provide structures for collective decisionmaking.
Property law also simply ignores many positive and negative
externalities. This is as it should be: Internalizing externalities is costly, and
not always worth doing.30 In some cases, internalizing an externality would
not alter an actor’s behavior because her internalized returns already cause
her to pursue the most efficient course of action—as where a polluting
factory would go on polluting at the same level if made to compensate its
neighbors.31 Even in cases where internalization would lead an actor to
make a different decision, a legal intervention may not be cost-justified. 32
The recipe for real property, then, comes down to combining three
strategies for managing the effects of activities on land: exclude (through
boundaries), govern (by managing spillovers around the edges), and tolerate
(by simply ignoring externalized effects).33 Significantly, the optimal mix of
exclusion, governance, and tolerance cannot be determined for all times and
contexts. Property’s best design depends on the sorts of land use activities,
and hence land use problems, that predominate in a given time and place.

25
See Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1332-33 (discussing the problem of optimal scale and its connection to
boundary placement).
26
Smith, supra note 23, at 1755-56 (distinguishing exclusion from governance).
27
Although it is most common to think of physically proximate others, time-limited estates can produce
temporal adjacency that is also prone to spillovers. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
71-75 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing temporal and physical division of property).
28
Smith, supra note 23, at 1756 (“Using fences to modulate complex questions of use—such as proper
grazing technique or optimal noise levels—would be prohibitively costly.”).
29
See id.; see also Smith, supra note 8.
30
See Demsetz, supra note 9, at 350 (“[P]roperty rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of
internalization become larger than the cost of internalization.”); id. at 351-52 (positing that before the fur trade
became established, the external impacts generated by open-access hunting “were of such small significance that
it did not pay for anyone to take them into account”).
31
See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Wm. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 371, 373–81
(1962) (distinguishing Pareto-relevant from Pareto-irrelevant externalities).
32
Private bargains to internalize externalities remain possible even when the law does not act in a concerted
manner to manage a given externality. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
Even if private bargains are unavailable, the costs of internalizing externalities through law may exceed their
benefits. See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 9, at 351-52.
33
The first two of these have been expressly offset in existing work. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 8.
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B. The Architecture of the Fee Simple
We can now examine how the design features of the FS fit into the
framework of strategies outlined above. This discussion will shed light on
the ways that the current structure may fail to align with the demands of an
increasingly interdependent society in which property configuration
represents a crucial source of value.
1. Exclusion
The FS maps onto a set of physical boundaries from which (most)
outsiders are presumptively excluded. These borders extend laterally across
the earth, and also vertically above and below it—until they bump into other
property holdings or trumping societal interests (separately owned mineral
estates, say, or airplane overflight zones). Property lines do not just define
the overall size and shape of the parcel but also physically anchor the estate
that the owner holds to specific map coordinates. In this manner, the FS
grants an exclusive right to a spatially defined piece of the physical world to
an owner who can (with some exceptions) trump the claims of all others to
make use of that space.
The temporal scope of exclusion is also notable: the FS is
unencumbered by future interests and perpetual in duration. An owner can
undertake projects of any length she chooses and wait indefinitely for her
investments and gambles on the land to pay off.34 Her tenure (and those of
her heirs and beneficiaries) is limited only by the durability of the legal and
political structures that support the estate, and by any caveats that those
same legal and political structures establish or reserve (such as eminent
domain). Uninvited outsiders are not merely excluded from a time slice, but
rather from the entire arrow of time.
Together, these boundaries grant owners perpetual monopolies on
specific spatial locations. The FS thus does an excellent job of encouraging
optimal investments in outcomes that are spatially constrained (within the
parcel) but temporally extended. For example, the unlimited time horizon
encourages owners to make the right choices between chopping down trees
now or letting them grow into larger trees35—at least if we assume that
neither the trees nor the chopping operations impact anyone outside of the
34
See id. at 1729; see also FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 370-73 [1921] (1957
edition) (discussing connections between risk and ownership, although expressing some skepticism about the need
for property interests to survive death).
35
This is a standard example in economics. See, e.g., LEE S. FRIEDMAN, THE MICROECONOMICS OF PUBLIC
POLICY ANALYSIS 709-12 (2002) (presenting “tree models”); POSNER, supra note 27, at 73 (explaining that a life
tenant would “want to cut timber before it has attained its mature growth—even though the present value of the
timber would be greater if the cutting of some or all of it were postponed—if the added value of the from waiting
would enure to the remaindermen”).
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owned parcel. In other words, the FS handily internalizes the sorts of purely
temporal spillovers that historically led to dust-ups between life tenants and
remaindermen, landlords and tenants.36
By contrast, the capacity of the FS to contain spatial impacts depends
on the size of the holding relative to the events taking place upon it. Thus,
the prevalence of what Robert Ellickson calls “small,” “medium,” or
“large” events will inform the question of how property should be held.37
The parcel does not have to be large enough to contain all the impacts of the
owner’s activities in order for the FS to work well—some impacts can be
reached through governance mechanisms or bargains, while others can
simply be ignored. But a pervasive mismatch between the property’s scope
and the scope of the owner’s impacts calls boundary placement into
question. Making boundaries too expansive can be as problematic as
making them too narrow, however. Not only must owners find a way to
manage the resources that lie inside the boundaries,38 expansive boundaries
may effectively trap resources in one owner’s hands that would be more
valuable in a number of other hands.39 In other words, there may be
diseconomies of scale as well as economies of scale.40
There can be diseconomies of scale in time as well as in space. Because
the temporal scale for human endeavors is never infinitely long, it is likely
that a given property holding will later come to be more valuably held by a
different party, one who is best positioned to oversee the endeavors on the
property that will have become the most valuable ones. As long as land is
freely alienable, this seems to present no problem; the owner simply lops
off the portion of time she cannot use herself by selling the property.41 A
difficulty arises, however, if the new use will require a larger spatial scale,
because the turnover in adjacent properties will most likely not be
synchronized. Thus, the FS’s lengthy temporal horizon can block the
realization of new spatial economies of scale.
This interaction follows from a key feature of boundary exclusion: the
veto rights that it grants owners. Subject to some qualifications,42 the FS
36
It may not do so perfectly, however. Just as a landowner’s actions may fail to account for costs imposed
on other people (externalities), her actions may fail to account for costs imposed on later versions of herself
(internalities). See, e.g., R.J. Herrnstein et al., Utility Maximization and Melioration: Internalities in Individual
Choice, 6 J. BEHAV. DECISION-MAKING 149, 150 (1993) (defining “‘internality’” as “a within-person
externality”).
37
Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1323-35.
38
See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386, 390-98 (1937).
39
For example, large holdings may contain excess capacity that will go to waste if it is too costly to transact
over. See Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of
Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 301-04 (2004) (describing excess capacity). Large property holdings
could also unduly concentrate ownership in too few hands. For some disadvantages of ownership concentration,
see Merrill, supra note 7, at 2094.
40
See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 9, at 358.
41
See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Property in Housing 12 ACADEMIA SINICA L.J. 31, 39-40 (2013).
42
There are some circumstances in which an owner’s possession can be truncated involuntarily. Not only
can an owner lose her property in predictable ways by failing to pay her mortgage or property taxes, but she might
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allows owners to stand on their rights and stay rooted in place. The owner’s
veto presents no difficulty when there are many good substitutes for the
property in question. But it becomes problematic when a set of properties
serve as strict complements in producing a larger economic benefit.
2. Governance
The FS does not rely on boundary exclusion alone; a variety of
governance mechanisms exist to address cross-boundary spillovers.
Negative externalities that pass a certain threshold are reachable through
nuisance law,43 while less serious impacts are reachable through finergrained land use regulations like zoning and covenants. Together, these land
use controls work fairly well to deal with spillovers that take the form of
impacts—debris, noises, smells, aesthetic effects—that literally or
figuratively come across the border from a party’s on-site operations.
Positive cross-boundary spillovers have not received parallel treatment.
Only in very limited circumstances can parties be made to pay their
neighbors for undertaking acts that incidentally benefit them.44 Yet positive
externalities are less neglected than one might conclude from reading
academic treatments of the issue. Coercion is rarely applied to the recipients
of positive externalities, to be sure, but coercion is routinely applied to
producers of positive externalities. Land owners are often required by land
use regulations or covenants to engage in certain affirmative acts for the
benefit of those around them.45 Put differently, whenever the failure to
provide a particular benefit to one’s neighbors becomes a large enough
problem for the community, it will be recharacterized as a harm and
controlled accordingly.46
Most notably, land use restrictions often ensure that landowners provide
reciprocal positive externalities to their neighbors by engaging in like uses.
For instance, an area zoned for single-family homes on large lots forces
each landowner to contribute to the neighborhood atmosphere enjoyed by
also be dispossessed by factors like eminent domain, natural disasters, or private lawlessness. See, e.g., John A.
Lovett, Property and Radically Changed Circumstances, 74 TENN. L. REV. 463 (2007) (examining property rights
in the wake of Hurricane Katrina); Nadav Shoked, The Duty to Maintain, 64 DUKE L.J. 437, 481-89 (2014)
(detailing avenues through which property may be forfeited through failure to undertake certain actions).
43
This might be either an absolute threshold, or one that is defined relative to the utility of the activity. See,
e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 782-83.
44
See, e.g., Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108 MICH.
L. REV. 189, 195–98 (2009).
45
See, e.g., Shoked, supra note 42; Larissa Katz, Governing Through Owners, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2029,
2051 (2012); Robert C. Ellickson, The Affirmative Duties of Property Owners: An Essay for Tom Merrill, 3
BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 43, 50-58 (2014).
46
For example, in Pigou’s time, refraining from emitting smoke from one’s smokestack was understood as
the conferral of a benefit; it is now natural to think of such smoky emissions as negative externalities. See James
E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 325, 325 n.3 (1992) (discussing
Pigou’s view of pollution control as generating a positive externality).
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her neighbors, even as it secures their reciprocal contributions to the
atmosphere she herself enjoys. Whether framed as controlling the negative
externalities associated with less compatible uses or as eliciting the positive
externalities that come from the specified use,47 such restrictions have the
effect of inducing behaviors designed to benefit the neighbors.48
Nonetheless, there are some positive externalities that are difficult for
existing governance tools to reach. Although there is no limit to how bad
impacts for neighbors can get and still be reachable through land use tools,
there is some practical limit to how much landowners can be required to do
for each other.49 Especially difficult to compel are unique inputs into shared
environments that cannot be reciprocally required of all owners within a
spatially proximate area. Neighbors could in theory find ways to coordinate
over these inputs once they are neighbors, but land use law has few
effective tools for assembling together the heterogeneous land uses and land
users that might be most capable of producing valuable synergies.

3. Tolerance
The FS does not internalize all externalities, whether through
boundaries or through governance. There are some externalities that it
simply tolerates. As a general matter, this is entirely appropriate and indeed
unavoidable. No property form can completely internalize all effects,
because to do so would be prohibitively costly. Moreover, externalities
often turn out to be irrelevant to efficiency.50 The interesting question is
whether the FS systematically ignores categories of impacts that have come
to have real economic significance. If so, then we must ask whether there is
any way to cost-effectively address those types of externalities.
Here it becomes relevant that the FS ignores two sets of external
impacts that have become increasingly important in urban areas—one by
design, and the other more contingently. First, because the very essence of
the FS is a perpetual spatial monopoly, the externalities that follow from
that design choice are an unavoidable part of the package. Although holdout
problems are not typically characterized in this way, they come down to
externalities: In an effort to garner more surplus for herself, the holdout
47
Any externality can be described in either positive or negative terms. See id; see also Lisa Grow Sun &
Brigham Daniels, Mirrored Externalities, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135 (2014) (providing an extended
exploration of this point).
48
As I will explore presently, such a single-use scheme may not produce the most valuable synergies among
uses. My point here is simply that existing land use tools can require owners to engage in uses that are thought to
benefit proximate others, and that these tools are thus not categorically inept at addressing positive externalities.
49
Lon Fuller makes a similar point in distinguishing the duties that everyone owes from the aspirations that
individuals might strive to achieve. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 27-28 (rev. ed. 1964).
50
See supra note 31and accompanying text.
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raises assembly costs (often to prohibitive levels) in ways that harm not
only herself but also the would-be assembler and others who would benefit
from the assembly.51 Holdout behavior can stymie not only efforts to
physically assemble land, but also to assemble complementary land users
and uses in proximity with each other.52
Second, the governance mechanisms with which the FS is commonly
paired cannot reach certain categories of positive spillovers: those that stem
from the unique, nonreciprocal contributions of proximate land users, and
that generate cumulative and often nonlinear effects. While coordination
mechanisms could be devised to reach these impacts,53 implementing them
in already-developed areas requires assembling consent among the relevant
proximate actors (or employing coercion to override the lack of consent).54
Moreover, optimizing the use of such mechanisms requires first solving the
configuration problem referenced above. For these reasons, the holdout
problems baked into the FS’s architecture get in the way of governance
innovations as well.
C. Adaptation and Evolution
Property can be understood as a dynamic institution, a living system that
evolves—or at least should evolve—over time in response to changes in
circumstances that alter how resources generate value. This raises the
question of whether the FS has adapted, or can adapt, to the changes that
urbanization has brought about in how property generates value.
1. Internalizing and Uninternalizing
Following Demsetz, we should internalize externalities when (and only
when) the gains from internalization outweigh the costs of delineating and
enforcing the relevant property rights.55 Thus, when a resource dramatically
increases in economic importance (Demsetz uses the example of fur-bearing
animals) it becomes worthwhile to internalize externalities (such as those
from overhunting) surrounding that resource.56 Property rights that had
51
See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 928-29 (2004)
(describing externalities generated by holdout behavior).
52
It is helpful here to recognize that placing land under one owner’s control is only one possible way to
achieve coordination among proximate uses. What must be assembled is a structure for coordinating resource
access and use. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 4, at 1529-30; Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL
STUD. 351, 351-53 (1991).
53
See supra note 17.
54
See, e.g., Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private
Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 834 (1999) (addressing this
issue in the context of creating neighborhood associations within established areas).
55
Id. at 350-51.
56
Id. at 350-53.
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previously not been worth the trouble of defining and enforcing become
valuable enough to pay their own way, and too costly to continue doing
without.
Although Demsetz himself focused on the rise of private property
rights,57 his logic operates in the reverse direction as well: We should stop
internalizing externalities when the cost of internalizing them rises too high
relative to the benefits associated with that internalization.58 To be sure,
some of the costs of internalization—such as those of defining property
rights—are sunk once private property has been established along particular
lines.59 But the costs of enforcing those rights are ongoing, and may
eventually become no longer worth incurring. Of particular relevance to the
discussion here is the cost of extending property rule protection and its
associated veto power to landowners for an indefinite period of time, as the
FS does.60
Even when internalization is cost-justified, a choice remains about how
to carry it out. We must decide which aspects of resource management will
be “automatically” incentivized through boundary placement61 and which
features can be effectively managed through governance mechanisms like
taxes, subsidies, regulation, covenants, zoning, and nuisance law. Changes
in the costs of carrying out exclusion or governance strategies—whether
due to changes in the scale of activities that are typically undertaken on
property, new technologies for governing or excluding,62 or otherwise—can
alter the ideal mix of strategies.63
2. Changing Sources of Value
Legal scholars have recently begun to focus sustained attention on the
challenges and opportunities presented by increasing urbanization.64 There
57

See generally id.
The idea that the Demsetzian process can “work[] in reverse” when the costs associated with property
rights grow too large has been noted in the intellectual property context. Jonathan Barnett, Property as Process:
How Innovation Markets Select Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 431-32 (2009); see also Eli M.
Salzberger, Economic Analysis of the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 27, 34-36 (L.
Guibault and P.B. Hugenholtz, eds., 2006) (extending Demsetz’s theory to “de-propertization”).
59
Richard N. Langlois, The Secret Life of Mundane Transaction Costs, 27 ORG. STUD. 1389, 1392-93 & fig.
1 (2006) (describing fixed and variable costs associated with property rights, and noting fixed costs may be sunk).
60
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18, at 1092 (defining property rules and distinguishing them from
liability rules)
61
See Robert C. Ellickson, The Costs of Complex Land Titles: Two Examples from China, 1 BRIGHAMKANNER PROP. RTS CONF. J. 281, 284 (2012) (“When a private farmer is entitled to keep a crop he grows, for
example, he is automatically rewarded for choosing the best crop to plant, planting at the right time, weeding,
applying fertilizer, fallowing a field when appropriate, and so on.”).
62
A canonical example is barbed wire, which dramatically reduced the costs of fencing one’s land. See, e.g.,
Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON.
163, 172 (1975).
63
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 8, at S462-78.
64
See, e.g., David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507 (2010);
Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property, and Positive Externalities, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV.
58
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are a variety of mechanisms through which proximity generates value—
agglomeration economies—at various scales within cities and metropolitan
areas.65 A city’s or a metro area’s depth and variety of labor markets, social
scenes, and shopping opportunities influence the value to firms and
individuals of locating in the area,66 while combinations of particular land
uses at the neighborhood or block level can produce localized synergies.67
There are large literatures examining these and related effects that I will not
attempt to summarize here.68 I will instead make two claims about the way
life in urban areas alters the work that property is asked to do.
First, interdependence among landowners has made combinations or
patterns of property holdings a much more important source of property
value.69 For example, synergies among complementary uses together
contribute to a given district or neighborhood’s overall energy or vibe—
collectively determining, for instance, whether a city’s downtown has a
lively art or music scene, whether an area counts as a tech corridor, and
whether a neighborhood is historic, eclectic, or dull. The significance of
clusters of enterprises has received recent attention,70 along with the
possibility that small overlapping circles of interaction could provide the
key to understanding agglomeration’s benefits.71 Finding ways to bring
complementary land users into close proximity thus represents a primary
challenge, one that I have elsewhere termed a “participant assembly
problem.”72 To meet this challenge, we need property rights and property
forms that are good at making—and remaking—valuable patterns of use.
The second and related claim is that urbanization has made it much
more important to reach categories of externalities that have historically
been ignored. Consider the owner’s veto power. As long as socially
valuable projects that use land as an input rarely depend on obtaining a
211 (2012); Daniel B. Rodriguez & David Schleicher, The Location Market, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 637 (2012);
Lee Anne Fennell, Agglomerama, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1373 (2015).
65
Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 64, at 638; Pierre-Phillippe Combes & Laurent Gobillon, The
Empirics of Agglomeration Economies, in 5 HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 247, 294–95
(Gilles Duranton et al. eds., 2015).
66
See, e.g., Gilles Duranton & Diego Puga, Micro-Foundations of Urban Agglomeration Economies, in 4
HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 2063, 2086-98 (2004); Schleicher, supra note 64, at 1521-23.
67
See, e.g., Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 64, at 647 (discussing small-scale “microagglomerations”
from larger-scale agglomeration effects).
68
For some starting points, see, for example, ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS IV.X.7–13 §3
(8th ed. 1920), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Marshall/marP.html; EDWARD L. GLAESER, CITIES,
AGGLOMERATION, AND SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM (2008); Duranton & Puga, supra note 66.
69
See, e.g., LEWIS D. HOPKINS, URBAN DEVELOPMENT: THE LOGIC OF MAKING PLANS 27-28 (2001)
(defining and discussing interdependence).
70
See, e.g., Aaron Chatterji et al., Clusters of Entrepreneurship and Innovation, 14 INNOVATION POLICY
AND THE ECONOMY 129 (2014); Gilles Duranton & William Kerr, The Logic of Agglomeration, NBER Working
Paper No. 21452 (August 2015) available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w21452 .
71
William R. Kerr & Scott Dukes Kominers, Agglomerative Forces and Cluster Shapes, NBER Working
Paper No. 16639 (December 2010) available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16639; Duranton & Kerr, supra note
70.
72
See Fennell, supra note 64, at 1375, 1389-96.
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complete set of complementary parcels from potentially recalcitrant
owners—that is, as long as many good substitutes exist—the owner’s
nominal spatial monopoly is of little moment. But when an owner’s
property represents a unique ingredient to a valuable assembly, she can
exercise the veto power in socially harmful ways. Urbanization makes
complementarities among holdings an increasingly important source of
value, which sharpens holdout problems and raises their costs.
The positive externalities associated with patterns of land use have also
become far more economically significant while remaining difficult to reach
through traditional governance mechanisms like zoning and covenants.
Individual households and firms are part of larger land use patterns, but do
not internalize the costs and benefits associated with their place within the
pattern.73 Of course, many externalities are irrelevant to efficiency; actors
may do the efficient thing for their own reasons.74 Is this the case for the
sorts of spatial investments that yield agglomeration economies?
The answer may depend in part on whether the acts that generate these
externalities are discrete or “lumpy” in nature rather than comprising a
continuous spectrum of choices.75 If private returns are enough to trigger an
entire lumpy action, the fact that positive spillovers benefit others will be
irrelevant.76 By contrast, we might expect a party who is choosing how
much to contribute to a social good to contribute too little if she cannot
capture all the gains. In other words, decisions made on the intensive
margin (how much to do something) may be more sensitive to externalities
than those made on the extensive margin (whether to do something).
An interesting and to my knowledge unexplored question is whether
positive externalities have historically been easier for property systems to
ignore than negative externalities because they took lumpier forms that
made them less likely to be relevant to efficiency. Activities that generate
negative externalities like pollution or noise typically involve continuous
variables, often leading actors to do too much of them. Choices that
generate positive externalities may have traditionally been more discrete or
lumpy in nature—like the binary decision whether to attend a festival, open
up a store, or plant a rose garden.77 But that may be changing. Modern
73

Cf. JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: MORE NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES at
388-89 (revised ed. 2007) (presenting “Living Flag” example from Garrison Keillor in which townspeople were
unable to both be part of a flag pattern as viewed aerially and view that pattern themselves).
74
See Buchanan & Stubblebine, supra note 31, at 373–81; David D. Haddock, Irrelevant Externality Angst,
19 J. INTERDISC. ECON. 3 (2007).
75
See Lee Anne Fennell, Slicing Spontaneity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2365, 2378-82 (2015); Mark P. Gergen,
The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 997, 1013–19 (1992).
76
See Fennell, supra note 75, at 2378-81. The same idea was explored in a somewhat different context in
Gergen, supra note 75, at 1013-19. To use Gergen’s example, a real estate agent may undertake an optimal step
like listing the home on a multilisting service, despite receiving only a fraction of the return from the home’s sales
proceeds, if there is no way for her to do less and still receive any return. See id.
77
To be sure, the choices in these examples are not truly binary insofar as one can be a better or worse
festival participant, have a more or less elaborate garden, or open a larger or smaller shop. But the choice
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urban agglomeration benefits likely turn less on discrete on-off choices like
garden planting and more on continuous choices about levels of economic
investment in the area that might, for example, attract increased foot traffic.
Thus, one interpretation of the growing significance of urban
agglomeration benefits is that positive externalities, which used to be either
largely irrelevant to efficiency or easy to capture through reciprocally
enforced requirements, now take forms that render them at once more
elusive and more relevant to efficiency. At the same time, the negative
externalities associated with the owner’s veto have become far more
socially costly, impeding valuable patterns of complementary uses.
3. The Prospects for Adaptation
The discussion above suggests that urbanization has rendered the FS
paradigm more costly and less beneficial as our default property form.
Following Demsetz, we might expect changes in property law to ensue.
That we have not seen a shift away from the FS might be interpreted as a
failure of adaptation. But it might also be interpreted as evidence that our
property laws have in fact successfully adapted (and will continue
successfully adapting) to keep the FS in fighting trim as conditions change.
There is some support for this faith in the FS’s adaptability. 78 But there is
also some reason for doubt.
Notably, Demsetz did not specify a mechanism for establishing new
property rights.79 Indeed, his account was not meant to be an evolutionary
one at all.80 In a recent paper, Lee Alston and Bernardo Mueller explain
how an approach employing evolutionary theory might map a “fitness
landscape,” and place property forms upon it based upon the attributes they
possess.81 The terrain of that landscape might be very “rugged” and multipeaked because the attributes of property are heavily interdependent, so that
choosing to jettison or add one feature causes the value of other features to
resembles a binary one if we assume there is some minimum level of provision that is necessary in order for the
actor to enjoy any returns, and that this minimum level corresponds to a level of satiation for those nearby (or in
any event, a level sufficiently good that they would not be willing to pay the actor enough to increase her efforts).
See Haddock, supra note 74, at 10-11; Buchanan & Stubblebine, supra note 31, at 374.
78
See, e.g., Charles M. Haar, The Social Control of Urban Space, in CITIES AND SPACE: THE FUTURE USE
OF URBAN LAND 175, 175 (Lowdon, Wingo, Jr., ed., 1963) (positing, as a general claim “for discussion,” that “the
continued sway of outmoded legal institutions will not be the cause of any irrationality in the long-run trends of
urban space patterns.”). Haar’s essay emphasizes the dynamic structure of law and argues that “this country’s
legal climate is such that any strong and persistent pressure or need will make or force accommodation.” Id. at
176. Although he qualifies this claim, he expresses optimism about law’s capacity to adapt and cites a number of
innovations in land use controls to illustrate his point.
79
See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 21, at S333 (observing that Demsetz’s article “said virtually nothing about
the precise mechanism by which a society determines that the benefits of property exceed the costs”).
80
See James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 139,
142-43 (2009) (citing Harold Demsetz, Frischmann's View of “Toward a Theory of Property Rights,” 4 REV. L. &
ECON. 127, 128 (2008)); see also Alston & Mueller, supra note 21.
81
Alston & Mueller, supra note 21.
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change dramatically in value.82 In this world, it is possible to wind up at a
local maximum and be unable to easily reach a higher, but distant, peak.83
Small changes can make matters much worse, even if large changes would
represent improvements.84
Exogenous shocks can alter the relative fitness of different property
arrangements.85 The authors’ examples of such shocks include the demand
for beaver pelts in Demsetz’s model and the changes wrought by the
internet.86 Urbanization represents another large shock, but one that has
come about gradually. There has been no concentrated scramble for a
wholly new and “fitter” bundle but rather a series of adjustments, primarily
in the governance domain, designed around the polestar of the FS. Thus,
zoning and covenants have evolved, but remain unequal to the challenges
that urbanization has brought about, including the need for reconfiguration
as the efficient scale changes.
Eminent domain offers a more potent tool for addressing urban
reconfiguration challenges—one that has become both increasingly
necessary and increasingly controversial. This safety valve has remained
doctrinally open as a matter of federal constitutional law.87 But the political
response to such takings has hampered resort to this approach,88 even as the
economic pressure to employ it continues to intensify.
II. PROPERTY FOR THE CITY
Carol Rose once provocatively asked how our thinking about property
might change if a resource like water, rather than “immovable, enduring
land” served as “our chief symbol for property.”89 We might similarly
wonder how tenure forms might have developed had urban agglomeration,
not agricultural use, been the signal source of land value. Property directed
at optimizing synergies within cities’ prime collaboration space would
82
Such complementarity among property rights argues for making it available in particular packages, given
positive transaction costs. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More
Coasean, 54 J.L. & ECON. S77 (2011).
83
Alston & Mueller, supra note 21.
84
Cf. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 40 (3d ed. 2005) (describing a similar
phenomenon in the land use context, where transforming an area would add value but small steps in that direction
would subtract value).
85
See Alston & Mueller, supra note 21, at 2268 (explaining that these shocks can cause the fitness landscape
to shift or “dance,” and “what was a good design may no longer be able to deal with the new conflicts that arise
and a new fitter bundle may or may not evolve.”).
86
See id.
87
See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (finding economic redevelopment to be a
“public use” for purposes of eminent domain).
88
See e.g., ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND (2015) (describing the political backlash against the Kelo
decision, including some of the ways in which it fell short). Even where legislative or judicial responses did not
place hard legal constraints on the use of eminent domain for economic development, the anticipated political
fallout remains a practical constraint on this approach.
89
Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right? 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 351 (1996).
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likely look very different from property directed at optimizing the yield of
crops or herds. Endless time horizons might be swapped for greater
flexibility in configuration. And entitlements might focus more on
coordinating co-location, and less on physical rootedness. The sections
below examine these possibilities.
A. Ending Endlessness
The FS endures forever. This temporal feature has received a great deal
of credit for appropriately aligning incentives—and conversely, the absence
of this feature has been blamed for holding back economic progress. 90 The
optimality of perpetual rights to real property is rarely questioned, at least as
a robust default.91 For example, Ellickson describes “an infinite timehorizon” as “the economic ideal,”92 and views an endless estate as “a lowtransaction cost device for inducing a mortal landowner to conserve natural
resources for future generations.”93 Demsetz similarly explains that “an
owner of a private right to use land acts as a broker whose wealth depends
on how well he takes into account the competing claims of the present and
the future”94—an assessment that appears to be premised on an estate of
infinite duration.
1. Escape from Foreverland
The case for reconsidering how temporal externalities are internalized
turns on their relationship to other externalities that are of skyrocketing
economic significance. Once we understand an estate’s length as one of
several possible mechanisms for internalizing temporal externalities, and
once we further recognize (following Demsetz) that some externalities may
be too costly to internalize, it becomes unclear why perpetual estates are
necessarily the correct length. We no longer assume that an estate of infinite
physical height is optimal, for example, even though such an estate does an
outstanding job of capturing the effects, both positive and negative, of
vertical efforts undertaken on the land.95 We are, I suggest, in a similar
situation when it comes to the agglomeration benefits of cities, which are
difficult to realize in a system that uses as its basic building block an estate
90

See generally Ellickson, supra note 61.
See id. at 284 (noting the possible advantages of voluntarily chosen temporal splits that would shift risk).
92
Id. at 293.
93
Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1368.
94
Demsetz, supra note 9, at 355.
95
See Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1363 (discussing shifts in “vertical boundaries” after “aircraft opened
access to the skies, and mechanized drilling and mining equipment, to the subsurface,” both of which “pose an
efficient-boundary problem in the vertical dimension”) (footnote omitted); Gray, supra note 2, at 253 (“[F]ee
simple ownership cannot possibly confer on the modern landowner a limitless domain over the vertical column of
airspace grounded within the territorial boundaries of his or her realty.”).
91
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of perpetual duration.
This is not to lightly dismiss the advantages of building into a property
form an automatic method for internalizing purely temporal spillovers from
one period to the next. If we could costlessly keep this feature as standard
equipment for property holdings, doing so would be sensible. The problem
is that it does carry costs, and those costs are rising, even as the associated
benefits are diminishing. Robert Ellickson made an analogous (if opposite)
point in discussing the Chinese custom of dian, which granted a seller of
land and his heirs the right to repurchase the property much later at the
original sales price.96 As Ellickson explains, “[i]n a pre-commercial society,
as opposed to a commercial one, non-waivable redemption rights have
fewer costs and greater benefits.”97 We might similarly say that FS’s
infinite duration carried fewer costs and produced greater benefits in the
low-density agrarian society for which it was designed than it does in
today’s thoroughly urbanized society.
What was needed then was an estate that was temporally lengthy but
spatially well-scaled to individual holdings on which “small events” like
growing crops regularly occurred,98 and that facilitated easy negotiations
among close neighbors about “medium events,” like whether to dam a
river.99 What transpires in metropolitan areas today is a deeply
interdependent and ongoing mega-event. Relaxing the assumption that
estates must be perpetual as a matter of course offers new ways to address
these large-scale effects. Time-limited estates are not a new phenomenon,100
nor is the idea of keying the length of a property interest to surrounding
conditions or to the owner’s own use patterns.101 There is room to think
creatively about how to adapt these models for the urban context.
This is not to throw all concerns about temporal spillovers by the
boards. Presently we deal with spatial spillovers through extensive sets of
land use controls, not by mandating land holdings that are extremely large
physically. Similarly, there are ways to address temporal spillovers other
than through infinitely lengthy estates. Historically, the law of waste and
later the trust fulfilled this role,102 and the trust model might be adapted to
meet the challenge of managing multiple spatial and temporal scales in
urban areas.103 Bonding mechanisms might also be employed to address
96

Ellickson, supra note 61, at 281.
Id. at 294.
98
Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1325 (illustrating a “small event” with the example of growing a tomato plant).
99
See id. at 1330-31; Demsetz, supra note 9, at 356-58.
100
For a recent comparative survey of such property interests, see generally TIME-LIMITED INTERESTS IN
LAND (Cornelius van der Merwe & Alain-Laurent Verbeke, eds, 2012).
101
For example, entitlements to water may be lost if the water is not put to beneficial use. See, e.g., Daphna
Lewinsohn-Zamir, More Is Not Always Better than Less: An Exploration in Property Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 634,
655-56 (discussing “use it or lose it” character of certain water rights).
102
See e.g., POSNER, supra note 27, at 73; DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 239-43.
103
Such an approach would recognize that failing to configure property and its users in a way that will
97
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more frequent turnover cycles.104 Finally, it worth observing that the
problem of temporal spillovers is not perfectly solved even by the FS; the
FS can and does generate moral hazard when owners can avoid taking
responsibility for negative-value properties.105
2. The Callable Fee
There are many ways that innovative time-limited estates might be
developed, and my hope is that this paper will spur interest in exploring
them. To fix ideas, however, consider the possibility of a callable fee—a
possessory estate that is subject to a call option after a given interval if
certain conditions are met.106
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the FS already is a callable
fee. The eminent domain power enables the government to truncate the FS
at will upon payment of compensation, provided that the taking is for a
public use. Because economic redevelopment counts as a public use—at
least under the U.S. Constitution107—the kinds of reconfigurations
necessary to optimize urban agglomerations can be legally achieved through
eminent domain. Political limits on the use of eminent domain may be much
tighter than legal restrictions, however, often rendering this course of action
unduly costly or unavailable. An expressly callable tenure form could
address this gap, while reducing reliance on a form of government coercion
that many view as unusually damaging and unfair.
Although it would often be desirable to introduce callable fees into
already developed areas, as I discuss below,108 it is easiest to describe how
they might be introduced in presently undeveloped areas, such as those on
the outskirts of an expanding city. A local government would begin by

maximize value also produces an opportunity cost, a flow of lost value that can also be understood as a type of
waste.
104
See, e.g., T. Nicolaus Tideman, Integrating Land-Value Taxation with the Internalization of Spatial
Externalities, 66 LAND ECON. 341, 346 (1990) (discussing potential use of bonds to address costs of
abandonment).
105
The fact that owners are unable to unilaterally divest themselves of legal ownership does not prevent
them from imposing costs on others if they can transfer the property to someone who is insolvent. See, e.g., Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 401 (2010). For a recent example, see Matthew
Walberg & Ted Gregory, Tax Buyer Deeds Abandoned Properties to Homeless Man, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 26, 2015,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-homeless-property-owner-met-20151025-story.html (reporting on the
transfer of several properties to a homeless man by a property investment firm that faced lawsuits filed by the City
of Chicago seeking to require it to rehabilitate the properties or pay for demolishing them).
106
See supra note 18 (defining call options). Other scholars have previously explored the idea of subjecting
property in various contexts to implicit or explicit call options that would be held and exercised by private parties.
See, e.g., Benito Arruñada and Amnon Lehavi, Prime Property Institutions for a Subprime Era: Toward
Innovative Models of Ownership, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 29-34 (2011); Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U
CHI. L. REV. 517 (2009); Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L. REV.
771, 778-83 (1982).
107
See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
108
See Part II.C.2, infra (addressing transition issues).
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designating one or more “callblocks” in these areas.109 These callblocks
would not necessarily correspond to city blocks, but rather would be
aggregations of property of sufficient scale and contiguity to accommodate
major future redevelopment efforts.110 The goal would be to identify
relatively self-contained modules that could be repurposed in the future
without slicing into important indivisibilities (such as tight-knit
neighborhoods) in surrounding areas.111
In the simplest scenario, the entire callblock would already be in unified
public or private ownership.112 In this case, the initial owner of the
properties could sell lots within the block to individual private owners for
residences or businesses, while retaining a call option on those properties.
The call option would make each new possessory owner subject to having
her property repurchased later, along with the other properties in the
callblock, at a price to be established through a fixed methodology (the
strike price), after a specified interval had passed (such as ten or twenty
years), if certain substantive conditions were met. These trigger conditions
might include underperformance of the callblock as a whole on preestablished metrics (property value declines, residential density shortfalls,
lack of sufficient affordable housing, and so on). The initial public or
private owner of the callblock properties could hold onto these options, or
resell them as a block to a private developer or a public entity.
The party holding the block of call options when the relevant conditions
were met (typically, a private developer) could choose to exercise those
options upon paying the specified strike price to the holders of the
possessory estates.113 If the developer chose to exercise the options, she
would be required to do so with respect to the entire callblock on an all-ornothing basis.114 This would help to ensure that the repurchase would be
109
Whether this designation would be a compensable event is taken up below. The owner would effectively
be required to split up an FS into two pieces, a call option and an estate subject to that call option.
110
The boundaries of the callblocks could be informed both by crowdsourced information about perceived
community boundaries and through market research into the sizes and configurations predicted to be most
valuable going forward.
111
The sort of modularity I have in mind here is related to but differs from Henry Smith’s. See, e.g., Henry
E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2097, 2115-16 (2012). Smith focuses on
modularity as an attribute of property itself, with each piece of property operating as an opaque module with
certain standardized attributes that facilitate interaction. My analysis focuses on how sets of complementary uses
form larger-scale units that might be addressed as such. See also Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA.
L. REV. 1955, 1978-84 (2012) (recasting key debates among property scholars as disagreements about the scale at
which to assess and pursue complementarity).
112
If the callblock was initially divided among multiple owners, a methodology for consolidating the options
for the entire callblock in a single party’s hands would need to be established, such as a system of buyouts.
113
Of course she would not be obligated to do so. The essence of an option is that it provides the right, but
not the obligation, to do something -- here, engage in a repurchase on specified terms. See BREALEY ET AL.,
supra note 18, at 503-05.
114
In this sense, the callblock setup would produce a kind of forced ownership – the option holder must take
the entire block if she chooses to engage in a repurchase at all. See Lee Anne Fennell, Forcings, 114 COLUM L.
REV. 1297, 1356 (2014) (discussing bundles offered on an all-or-nothing basis as examples of forcings); see also
Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, Land Demarcation Systems, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
PROPERTY LAW 257, 286 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011) (discussing the analogous point that a
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prompted by changes in the efficient scale of development rather than by a
desire to cherry-pick particular properties that have become more attractive.
Once the call is exercised and the strike price is paid to the owners, the
property would be turned over to the developer in compliance with an
established schedule, allowing a reasonable period for transition.
The land at this point would be reconsolidated. The developer could
then resell individual parcels, typically after undertaking large-scale
redevelopment, but these sales would again be in the form of callable
fees.115 The callblock of options associated with the parcels would be kept
intact as a unit, either to be retained by this developer, or resold as a block
to another private or governmental party. This would make it possible to
again reassemble the callblock in the future, for further redevelopment. The
government could redraw the boundaries of the callblocks at a later date
based on long-term predictions about changes in efficient scale or
configuration. But until it did so, the associated options would be
maintained as a unit, enabling the entire module to be serially redeveloped.
3. Design Considerations
Strike prices, timing, and other trigger conditions would all require
considerable design attention, which I can only briefly touch on here. The
strike price would determine the amount of compensation that the owner of
the possessory estate would receive if the call option were exercised. As in
the eminent domain context, compensation levels must balance the moral
hazard of wasteful overdevelopment in the shadow of compensated takings
against the costs of underinvestment that might be associated with
anticipated undercompensation.116 Owners who voluntarily purchased
callable fees could price in the expected costs of any particular
compensation scheme, but compensation protocols could be consciously
designed with incentives in mind.117
For example, a certain degree of undercompensation, coupled with
appropriate trigger conditions, could powerfully catalyze cooperative
behavior among neighboring land owners to keep those conditions from
rectangular parcel system has the effect of “making the buyer take the good land with the bad”).
115
Resale of individual parcels within a particular period could be a required part of the overall scheme in
some areas, if one of the goals of this approach is to keep land in many hands rather than consolidated in those of
a single owner.
116
See, e.g., Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, & Perry Shapiro, The Taking of Land: When Should
Compensation be Paid? 99 Q.J. ECON. 71 (1984); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and
Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of “Just Compensation” Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 27075 (1988); Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1,
19-22 (1985).
117
An interesting line of work has considered how express options might improve incentives for landowners
and the government in the eminent domain context. See, e.g., Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 116, at 274-75 & n.
12 (discussing the possibility that government could acquire options to compensate only for land and not
buildings, and citing work on this alternative); Cooter, supra note 116, at 22-23.
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coming about and thereby stave off calls. As important, designated
callblocks might draw together those who are best positioned to engage in
cooperative action with their neighbors to achieve the specified
performance measures. This outcome be a double-edged sword, however, as
some collective neighbor behavior can be harmful and exclusionary. The
trigger conditions (and surrounding regulatory regime) must be formulated
with care to channel collective action in socially desirable directions.118
An analogy might be drawn to beneficial use requirements in water law,
and other “use or lose” rules applied to property interests. 119 These too
extend a kind of call option on underutilized property. The difference here
is that keeping or losing a callable fee depends not just on the individual
owner’s use, but on that of all the owners within the callblock. The
arrangement would operate on a principle that is similar in some ways to
group liability, which can incentivize certain mechanisms of intragroup
control—for better or worse.120 At its best, a tool for easing reconfiguration
might double as a diagnostic for determining when reconfiguration is really
necessary and as a prompt for private experimentation in small-scale urban
cooperation. Private innovations, devised in the shadow of a potential call,
could in some cases obviate the need for redevelopment altogether.
Establishing callable fees in certain sectors of the city would also induce
self-selection among potential owners based on preferences for length of
tenure.121 Option periods for different blocks of properties could be
staggered to create a ladder effect, so that at any given time some blocks of
property within a city would be coming online for renewal while most areas
would be relatively immunized from redevelopment.122 The risk of the
property being called would be priced into the value of the property, as
would the potential for nearby development that would enhance the value of
the property.123 Owners who wanted a higher level of security could buy in
an area where FS’s remain available, or choose callable fees in a district
unlikely to be redeveloped soon (where the price would be accordingly
118
See text accompanying notes 169-170, infra (discussing how trigger conditions for callable fees might be
combined with mechanisms for reducing investment risk to shift the incentive structure facing homeowners).
119
See, e.g., Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 101, at 655-56 (examining use or lose requirements); Singer,
supra note 7, at 317-18 (noting antecedents forms of conditional property, from homesteading requirements to
adverse possession); see also Shoked, supra note 42, at 481-89.
120
See, e.g., Daryl Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 378-91 (2003) (explaining how
group sanctions can leverage and build solidarity while carrying the potential for unwanted side effects such as
excessive levels of control). Another parallel is worth noting: the potential that the existence of a group sanction
(here, the risk of dispossession) will create pressures toward sorting in group composition. See id. at 391-94.
121
Cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Precaution, 4 J. TORT L. 1 (2011) (proposing mechanisms that would
allow property owners to voluntarily downgrade some of their entitlements to liability rule protection).
122
Of course, the government cannot bind itself to not exercise eminent domain. But a widespread system of
callable fees might be expected to concentrate development along the political path of least resistance—the
exercise of call options—rather than through new development elsewhere.
123
Cf. Sebastien Gay & Nadia Nasser-Ghodsi, Guarding the Subjective Premium: Condemnation Risk
Discounts in the Housing Market, 89 TUL. L. REV. 79, 84-93 (2014) (suggesting that property values are sensitive
both to condemnation risk and to the potential gains of nearby condemnations leading to redevelopment).
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higher).
Buyers must already make such calculations to some degree: An
expanding city can thwart plans and even render property useless, and
eminent domain poses more of a threat to languishing areas than to thriving
ones.124 The callable fee would add transparency to the mix.
B. Rethinking Rootedness
The FS’s endlessness impedes reconfiguration because of the monopoly
power it confers. A different tack to take in defusing that power would
involve untethering the estate from its geographic footprint. Interestingly, a
major conceptual component of this approach is already in place: Under
Anglo-American law, an “estate in land” is viewed as something separate
and distinct from the land itself.125 Anchoring that estate to a particular
geographic position might seem like an important and obvious move, but it
turns out to be deeply contingent.
1. Assessing Anchoring
Consider what anchoring accomplishes. It allows trade to proceed over
not just the abstract dimensions of a piece of property but also its unique
qualities (soil, minerals, water features) and topography. Anchoring
establishes continuity of possession over the physical attributes of the land,
which internalizes the effects of acts on the land. Trees are rooted (literally)
and present the owner with the choice between chopping now and chopping
later. Crops are anchored in space, so owners must reap where they sow.
Cattle are not immobile, but their grazing imposes costs that an owner of
both pasture and cow is in the best position to trade off against the benefits.
Physical mooring seems essential in all of these contexts. It is also simply a
convenient way to demarcate what is owned; there has historically been
little need to make things more complex.
As these examples suggest, physical rootedness is most valuable when
the land itself is the repository of an owner’s investment efforts and the
place where returns from those efforts must be collected. And rootedness is
least costly when there is little anticipated need for reconfiguration. Urban
landscapes flip this equation. In cities, it is the relative rather than absolute
position of a land use that delivers the bulk of its value. At the same time,
the ability to reconfigure holdings and rescale uses represents a primary
124

See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
See e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 217 (“Instead of thinking of the land itself, the lawyer
thinks of an estate in land, which is imagined as almost having a real existence apart from the land.” (fn omitted);
Raffaele Caterina, Setting the Scene, in TIME-LIMITED INTERESTS IN LAND, supra note 100, at 3, 4 (explaining
that “English law . . . divorced ownership from land itself and attached it to an imaginary thing called an estate”).
125
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source of value.
It might seem that immobile structures (commercial, residential,
industrial) also require continuity of geographic location. After all, they are
costly to construct and often tailored for a particular user (or become so
over time). But the need for geographic continuity becomes more
contingent to the extent that buildings of a certain type are either fungible
with each other or capable of replication in (or transport to) new positions.
Although structures are costly to destroy and rebuild (or move), the cost
may at times compare favorably to that of alternative ways of reclaiming
prime urban land for a highly valued purpose. Currently, there is no method
short of eminent domain to accomplish cost-effective rearrangements.
Loosening the connection between estates and geographic coordinates could
offer an alternative.
2. The Floating Fee
To spur thought about the form such an untethered estate might take,
consider the possibility of a “floating fee.” Under this model, the estate in
land that an owner holds is not immutably moored to a fixed set of
geographic coordinates, but instead represents a portable claim over
equivalent property in other locations. Although the idea sounds unusual, it
is not without antecedents, both in the literature and in practice.
An important example is found in land readjustment, which has been
used in limited ways in the United States and more extensively in a number
of other countries.126 Many variations exist, but the core idea can be
illustrated with an example. Suppose a low-density residential area on the
edge of an expanding urban center would be more valuably reconfigured
into a higher density mix of housing, retail, and parkland. After the relevant
procedures are engaged for triggering the readjustment mechanism, the area
would be redeveloped, with residents receiving equally valuable property
within the redevelopment area.127 Although the post-redevelopment
holdings would be smaller and would occupy different spatial footprints
than before, the redevelopment would have rendered the residents’ new
property at least as valuable as the old.128
While land readjustment can be pursued legislatively without resort to a
floating fee, designating property in this way would allow people to opt into
districts that are designed to be subject to such redevelopment. As with the
126
See generally ANALYZING LAND READJUSTMENT: ECONOMICS, LAW, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION (YuHung Hong & Barrie Needham, eds., 2007).
127
See Yu-Hung Hong, Assembling Land for Urban Development in ANALYZING LAND READJUSTMENT,
supra note 126 at 3, 23. They would also have an option to sell the land. See id. Under some models, the
displaced parties instead receive shares of the new development or a right to buy “an equivalent housing unit.”
See id. at 24.
128
Id. at 23.
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callable fee, this could induce useful self-selection. A number of details
would have to be hashed out: the initiation procedures, the way in which
equivalent land is defined, and cash-out procedures for those who do not
want the in-kind compensation.129 But the fact that this approach offers
displaced residents a continuing place in the community is an appealing
feature, and one that aligns with an understanding that co-location, rather
than location per se, is the primary source of urban value.130
3. Of Property and Portability
While land readjustment offers the most concrete and fully conceived
model for a floating fee, there are many other ways that untethered property
might operate. A range of existing portable claims—housing vouchers,131
vacation timeshares,132 continuing care retirement communities,133 and so
on134—offer models that might be adapted or mined for transferable lessons
(or cautions). While these examples currently operate within specialpurpose spheres, it is possible to imagine bringing portable claims more
squarely into the heartland of market-rate housing.
Entrepreneurs and commentators have already made some progress
along these lines. An enterprise called Kasita has recently attracted attention
for its plan to develop portable microhomes that will be designed to slide
interchangeably like drawers into and out of complexes in a number of
cities.135 But one need not create units that are capable of being physically
shipped across the country to carry out a similar plan.136 Richard Florida has
imagined sets of similar rental homes that households could seamlessly shift
among.137 Although leaseholds might initially seem better suited to this
129

These features are already addressed in existing models for land readjustment.
For recent work focusing on the significance of co-location, see, for example, Lee Anne Fennell, Colocation, Co-location, Co-location: Land Use and Housing Priorities Reimagined, 39 VT. L. REV. 925 (2015);
Schleicher, supra note 64, at 1509–10, 1515–29; Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 64.
131
Although often implemented in ways that severely constrain choice, Housing Choice Vouchers
(commonly known as Section 8 vouchers) offer portable claims on eligible housing.
132
See, e.g., Disney Vacation Club, https://disneyvacationclub.disney.go.com/membership/ (providing
information on a type of vacation timeshare that can be used at any of a number of different properties).
133
See, e.g., Ellen Graham, To Move or Not to Move, Wall St. J., June 20, 2009,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204333804574159582221794994 (describing continuing-care
retirement communities in which seniors can move to different types of housing units as their needs change).
134
One intriguing short-term portable claim is one’s position in a queue. See Kevin Gray, Property in a
Queue, in PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY 165, 175 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, eds., 2010)
(“The queuer holds, in effect, a kind of mobile property in land, a portable space that is uniquely and recognizably
his or hers and is defensible against all comers.”) (footnote omitted). The queue illustrates well how a portable
claim over property might be defined functionally based on its ability to provide proximity to transactions, rather
than based on its correspondence to a fixed map point.
135
See Matt Johnston, These Ingenious Tiny Homes Move with You from City to City, TECH INSIDER, Oct. 7,
2015, http://www.techinsider.io/tiny-smart-homes-move-2015-10; see also Kasita, http://www.kasita.com/ .
136
Indeed, the fact that so-called “mobile homes” are rarely moved from their initial location might suggest
that there is little demand for physically relocating structures from place to place.
137
RICHARD FLORIDA, THE GREAT RESET 176-77 (2010) (describing his vision of “plug-and-play housing”).
Florida sees this approach as an extension on existing models, such as the flexible extended stay rental model
130
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approach than freeholds, a mobile version of homeownership coupled with
portable mortgages is not beyond imagining.138
Suppose, for example, that a set of homes distributed throughout a
metro area were designated as “floating estates.” Although buyers would
choose a specific home as usual, they would purchase not the home itself
but rather a portable claim equal to their investment—one that would grow
as they built up equity or as improvements to the home were made that
enhanced its value.139 At designated intervals or on their own initiative,
owners of these estates could bid to “shift their claim” by moving to another
home within the system, dependent on availability. A portable mortgage
could be shifted to the new property at the time of the move and differences
in the value of the old and new home could be paid or received. The entire
system could be managed by a governing body akin to a homeowners
association, with the relevant community consisting not of a group of
contiguous property holders but rather scattered holders of claims within a
floating estate system.
Holders of these floating estates might also be made vulnerable to a
shift to a different home in the event of a change in land use in the
immediate area. For some, the ability to initiate seamless moves would
mitigate or counterbalance the risk of a possible involuntary displacement,
especially if meaningful choice about the destination home were made
possible by the many voluntary moves of others. Those undergoing
involuntary shifts could be provided guarantees with respect to proximity
and other features (along with a put option to simply exit the system and
receive fair market value). Groups of residents could be guaranteed moves
that would relocate them as a cohesive unit, preserving intra-group
proximity and assuring continued co-consumption of local public goods like
education and safety.140 Compensation for displacement could also be
provided, scaled to the degree to which the family’s destination home
differed from the family’s preferred home along designated dimensions.
A geographically scaled-up version of this model could facilitate
voluntary moves among metro areas. This too would help to serve urban
land use needs writ large by facilitating efficient shifts of human capital.
employed by AVE Korman Communities.
137
See id. at 174; see also AVE, What Is Ave, http://www.aveliving.com/what-is-ave.aspx (describing the
extended stay options available in multiple cities).
138
Some limited examples of portable mortgages have been found in the US. but the idea has not taken hold;
they are somewhat more common in other countries. See, e.g., Jeffrey Lubell, Housing More People More
Effectively Through a Dynamic Housing Policy, Abt Associates, December 2014, at 28-29 & n. 64 available at
http://www.abtassociates.com/AbtAssociates/files/ce/ce7c306c-3cce-4dda-96c8-6098abe8a5ac.pdf (describing the
workings of portable mortgages and noting the current dearth of these alternatives in the U.S.).
139
Such a model would work well with a reduced-risk form of homeownership in which the risk associated
with housing market fluctuations would be outsourced, although this would not be an essential feature if all the
homes in the system were in closely correlated local housing markets. See infra notes 169-171 and accompanying
text.
140
I thank Lior Strahilevitz for comments on this point.
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While much of this paper has focused on the need to periodically clear the
slate within urban areas to enable redevelopment—and hence on moving
existing uses out of the way—it is just as important to devise mechanisms
that can support the mobility of people and firms to the places where they
can add the most value.
While such an approach is not for everyone, it would provide more
stability than many leaseholds, as well as flexibility that might be attractive
to households with uncertain job prospects or changing family needs. And
it might be especially attractive to a new generation that is less enamored of
homeownership and already comfortable navigating fluid systems like
Airbnb. Finally, although it is not my focus here, it is worth observing that
natural changes such as sea level rise may also create pressure in the
direction of shifting or mobile property interests.141 The common theme is
the need for adaptation to changing conditions, whether the product of
natural or social phenomena.
C. Making the Switch
The ideas sketched thus far are just that, sketches—departure points for
further exploration, not fully conceived new institutional arrangements.
Retrofitting property for modern conditions is a large project, one that I can
only hope to set in motion here. My primary goal in this paper is to suggest
the need for a foundational shift in the way real property is conceptualized.
Section 1 below discusses the nature of that shift. Sections 2 and 3 turn to
more practical aspects of a paradigm shift in real property’s form—
transition issues, and the interaction between limited fees and other existing
and proposed approaches to land use control.
1. From Enduring Things to Access Streams
Property theory is dominated by a thing-based paradigm that
emphasizes the exclusion strategy.142 The appeal of this paradigm is
undeniable: Drawing boundaries around resources and keeping interlopers
out is an ingenious way to pair inputs and outcomes across a range of
141
For example, “rolling easements” (which comprise a number of distinct legal arrangements) are types of
untethered property interests. See, e.g., Michael Allan Wolf, Strategies for Making Sea-Level Rise Adaptation
Tools “Takings-Proof,” 28 J. LAND USE & ENVIRON. L. 157, 192-93 (2013). For discussion of the ambulatory line
between public and private ownership along the shoreline, see generally Katrina M. Wyman and Nicholas R.
Williams, Migrating Boundaries, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1957 (2013).
142
The thing-based approach has been most strongly associated with the work of Henry Smith. See, e.g.,
Smith, supra note 5. Although Smith claims his is an outlier view among property theorists, his conceptualization
not only aligns with popular perceptions of property but also represents the dominant theoretical starting point
with which all property theorists must contend. See Ezra Rosser, Destabilizing Property, CONN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016), draft at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2581710 (“Smith describes himself as the underdog, even
though he and others who share his perspective on property are winning.”).
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settings. These are, unsurprisingly, the settings from which exclusion
theorists overwhelmingly draw their motivating examples. Points about how
property is or must be structured rely heavily on a set of stock characters:
farms, crops, herds, decontextualized single-family homes, and privately
owned cars.143 These familiar illustrations obscure the fact that there are
important contexts in which the exclusion approach does not work well—
from water rights144 to the urban areas in which most human beings now
live.145
There have been challenges to the dominant property paradigm, but they
have primarily come in the form of pushback against strong exclusion
rights.146 Both sides in the exclusion debate seem to agree that the core of
value lies inside the boundaries, and the only question is who will be
allowed to get at it. The message here is different. There is nothing (much)
of value inside property boundaries unless the right things are happening
outside those property boundaries. Assigning people rights in physical
space for a period of time remains a way of delivering access to a
consumption stream, but that stream is fed and diverted by acts undertaken
by many parties both on and off the parcel. 147 And one of the primary ways
in which the consumption stream is enriched is through property
reconfiguration that enables development at different scales.
Maintaining dominion over a physical thing in perpetuity is no longer a
particularly good way of ensuring access to the relevant stream of resources
over time. Just as advances in cloud-based computing have made continuity
in individually owned devices less crucial than it once was, so too may we
come to understand buildings and plots of land less as ultimate repositories
of value than as mechanisms for accessing value that resides elsewhere.148
Seeing real property as primarily constituting “portal rights” into the
143
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 5, at 1702-06 (using examples of cars and “Blackacre”); id. at 1720-21
(discussing “fencing in” rule to address wandering cattle); Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA.
L. REV. 2061, 2071-72 (2012) (giving “archetypical example” of an American family farm); Thomas W. Merrill,
Property as Modularity, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 151, 155-57 (2012) (discussing how a farmer who owns “the
proverbial Blackacre” can expand holdings modularly by adding more land, a tractor, a barn, livestock and so on,
and noting in passing that “a similar story can be told about the factory owner, the owner of an apartment
complex, and so on and so forth.”); id. at 161-62 (discussing crop examples); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 388-91 (2001) (discussing cattle
fencing, based on Robert Ellickson’s study in Shasta County); id. at 361-62 (citing and discussing Blackstone on
the importance of protecting the right to reap where one has sown); see also Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Private
Law Theory: A Comment on Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 133, 140 (2012) ( “The Law of
Things uses land and cars as paradigm cases of property.”) (discussing Smith, supra note 5).
144
Claeys, supra note 143, at 140-41 (criticizing Smith’s approach for marginalizing riparian rights).
145
See supra note 10.
146
See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 745, 746-48 (2009).
147
Contrast this very different understanding of the returns to ownership, which is prefaced by agricultural
examples: “Property is like a profit-sharing plan in which 100% of the profits go to the individual profit center, or
an incentive compensation scheme in which 100% of the compensation is in stock options.” Merrill, Property as
Modularity, supra note 143, at 162.
148
See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 130, at 941-42.
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surrounding urban value creation machine, rather an as owned patch of
earth, illuminates the real end and aim of ownership—delivering access to
resources. Some continuity of physical possession is important to that
enterprise, but how much? Something well short of eternity, I posit, can do
nicely.
The mental shift I am urging here is echoed in some ways by
innovations in the so-called sharing economy. Access to resources, not the
ownership of things, is increasingly becoming the coin of the realm. Finding
functional ways to deliver that access is the overarching enterprise. The
business model of an Airbnb or a Zipcar cannot, of course, be extended in a
simplistic way to all of property ownership—continuity of possession
continues to generate benefits that cannot be replicated through finely-sliced
use rights. But neither should we neglect the lesson that traditional
ownership of enduring objects is only one way, and often not the best way,
to gain access to valuable resources.
2. Transition Issues
A primary rationale behind floating and callable fees is to ease future
transitions when the scale of efficient use changes and there is an
accompanying need to reconfigure holdings and uses. But what about the
initial transition that is required to get such a system of limited fees started
in the first place? We can, of course, simply posit a clean slate—a set of
properties that have been cleared through traditional eminent domain or that
happen to be under the control of a developer or other single owner
already.149 In these contexts, it would be possible to simply sell individual
parcels subject to options. But it would make little sense to limit floating
and callable fees to these contexts. The places where reconfiguration is
likely to be most valuable going forward may very well be already
developed and fragmented among many owners. Moreover, concerns about
eminent domain form part of the rationale for using limited fees to ease
reconfiguration.
Suppose, then, that a local government wished to introduce a callable or
floating fee district in an existing, already-developed area. To accomplish
this result, the entitlements held by each existing owner would be
effectively downgraded from an FS to a type of defeasible fee, one subject
to an option that can be exercised upon specified conditions and within
specified time windows, for specified levels of compensation.150 One
149

See text accompanying supra note 108 (positing such a clean slate, for expository simplicity).
The callable fee would contemplate cash compensation while the floating fee might be characterized as
providing in-kind compensation. The move to a floating fee could be understood as replacing a fixed estate with a
portable one at the time the limited estate is established; in-kind compensation for the fixed estate comes in the
form of the portable estate and the associated reciprocal benefits of making the surrounding estates portable as
150
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possibility would be to condemn the rights associated with the option to call
or move the estate, with compensation provided. Alternatively, a
supermajority vote might be legislatively prescribed in order to form the
district, as with compulsory unitization in the oil and gas context.151 The
latter approach might be attractive where the designated community as a
whole stands to gain from the associated future flexibility.152
As a doctrinal matter, it is not evident that the kind of adjustment in
tenure form contemplated here represents a compensable taking in itself,
assuming compensation would be provided at the point when displacement
actually occurs. Suppose the option to which the land is made subject
complies with the standards for the exercise of eminent domain in the
jurisdiction—that is, the strike price constitutes just compensation and the
conditions for calling or relocating the estate qualify the shift as one for
public use. If the trigger conditions for calls and moves are set up to enable
reconfiguration only when another configuration is likely to produce higher
value, the latter condition would seem to be met,153 and the former
condition would be satisfied as long as at least fair market value is provided
to owners.154 In such a case, it would not seem that the mere shift to a
callable or floating fee would require separate compensation. The explicit
option would merely track the substance of the implicit option that the
power of eminent domain already embodies.
This is not to suggest that no change has been introduced, or that no one
has been disadvantaged relative to the status quo ante. To the extent that
limited property forms of the nature contemplated here lower the political
price of displacement, people may run a higher risk of displacement.155
Some transition relief might therefore be provided to those placed more
immediately at risk of displacement, funded by those in areas that remain in
well.
151
See Libecap, supra note 17, at 161-62; see also Nelson, supra note 54, at 834 (proposing supermajority
rule for creating new neighborhood associations in existing communities).
152
These supermajority alternatives would resemble in some respects the land assembly districts proposed
by Michael Heller and Rick Hills. Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV.
1465 (2008), although differences may exist depending on what decisions the vote procedure is used to resolve
(e.g., whether it applies to the initial decision to form a floating fee district, or to particular decisions to undertake
rearrangements once such a district exists).
153
There is some question whether a legislative body could set in advance criteria for public use and then
allow a private party to proceed when those criteria are met. Making the criteria objective and verifiable would
help, but courts would likely demand an individualized determination in each case that the shift would serve a
public purpose—and might not look kindly on rubber-stamp approvals. See Southwestern Illinois Development
Authority v. National City Environmental L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1, 10 (2002) (finding that a development authority’s
attempted condemnation on behalf of a private party “was not clothed in an independent, legitimate governmental
decision to further a planned public use”).
154
Floating fees would characteristically provide compensation in kind, but including a fair market buyout
option would likely address compensation concerns. See Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan, “Paying” for the
Change: Using Eminent Domain to Secure Exactions and Sidestep Nollan and Dolan, 81 VA. L. REV. 1801, 184344 (1995) (discussing the constitutional status of an arrangement allowing monetary just compensation to be
waived in favor of in-kind compensation).
155
This point is considered in depth below. See infra Part III.C.

32

Fennell

[17-Jan-16

FS or are made subject to options that can be exercised further in the future.
In considering the appropriate level of compensation, however, it is
important to recognize that there is a form of in-kind compensation that is
reciprocally distributed to the population at the same time that this
disadvantage is introduced: the greater flexibility that comes from having
others nearby similarly subject to a limited fee that permits easier
reconfiguration.156
An analogy might be drawn to other historical transitions that property
law has made among tenure forms, such as the elimination of the fee tail.
The fee tail came to be regarded as an obstacle to social goals, and was
ultimately done away with, even though this inevitably truncated some
interests and enlarged others.157 Converting the FS to a floating or callable
fee would similarly strip away the veto rights that impede the achievement
of social goals. This would curtail the rights of owners in some respects
while simultaneously granting them greater access to the prospect of
valuable reconfiguration.
3. Connecting to Other Approaches
What would the adoption of callable or floating fees mean for existing
land use controls and proposed reforms? One possibility is that land use
controls could be loosened to permit more risk-taking and experimentation,
now that there is an orderly process for revising missteps and weeding out
failures.158 To the extent that some land use controls can be understood as
prophylactic measures designed to preserve future options, the need would
be obviated by explicit options capable of addressing later concerns. For
example, it is sometimes suggested that minimum lot sizes are meant to
protect against excessive spatial fragmentation, based on the idea that
reassembly would be far more difficult to accomplish at a later time.159
Keeping property in one large tract when it is more efficiently divided into
multiple pieces preserves an option to use the property at the large-tract
scale in the future, but it also carries an opportunity cost—one that is
unnecessary if the option can be preserved in other ways.
More interesting is the potential effect that these tenure forms might
156

Cf. Gay & Nasser-Ghodsi, supra note 123, at 84-93.
See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 225; Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to
Private Property, 19 J. L. ECON. 467, 471 (discussing Jefferson’s bill to abolish the entail in Virginia and quoting
his rationale, which included the idea that natural rights would not be deprived, but rather enlarged).
158
A more pessimistic account would focus on the new opportunities that revised tenure forms might
provide for government to extract value from private parties. But our present system of land use already carries
these risks, and it is unclear why tenure forms that provide more opportunities for redevelopment would make
matters worse.
159
See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1173 (1999)
(“[T]he dynamics of the one-way ratchet of fragmentation suggest another logic for minimum lot sizes: to
counteract market forces that might lead individuals to break up land too much.”).
157
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have on small-scale private land use controls, such as systems of covenants.
As already suggested, the callable fee could induce collective action aimed
at staving off calls, and might consequently produce innovative mechanisms
for fostering and harnessing cooperative efforts. This approach is not
without risk. Private solutions can be as coercive as public ones,160 and
long-range projects with large but deferred payoffs may be undervalued in a
system that makes continuity contingent on performance.161 But requiring
the unit to effectively “justify its existence” over a long enough period of
time could have a galvanizing effect in producing bottom-up solutions to
the collective problems of urban life: namely, how to get parties to act in
ways that will generate valuable positive spillovers and make the most of
complementarities.
One way to understand the challenge is to see urban energy or vibrancy
as a kind of “landscape level” resource that must be collectively managed at
a scale greater than the everyday activities that take place on the property.162
A number of alternatives exist, from separate ownership of the landscape
level resource itself to institutional arrangements that allow owners to work
together to optimize the shared resource. A unitization approach has been
used extensively in oil and gas contexts, where reserves exist at a scale
larger than the efficient use of the surface parcel. There, owners create a
decisionmaking body that will make optimal decisions about the resource
and equitably split up costs and revenues.163 This model is similar to the
trust, which emerged to solve an analogous problem of misaligned temporal
scales.164 In the urban context, such an approach could build on existing
structures like business improvement districts (BIDs)165 and proposed
variations like block-level improvement districts (BLIDs).166
Floating fees, at least those following the land readjustment model,
160
See, e.g., Stephen Clowney, Rule of Flesh and Bone: The Dark Side of Informal Property Rights, 2015 U.
ILL. L. REV. 59.
161
There are obvious parallels to academic tenure (and other forms of job security) here. Reevaluation (at
the extreme, periodically “reinterviewing” for one’s job) may keep incentives sharp, but these advantages must be
weighed against potential demoralization and the benefits of allowing people to engage in long-range projects
without obvious near-term payoffs. See also Singer, supra note 7, at 317-18 (noting the value judgments inherent
in choosing whether to make continued possession of property contingent rather than presumptive).
162
See Schulz & Lueck, supra note 17.
163
However, there are difficulties in initially establishing unitization, often requiring some form of coercion.
Libecap, involuntary unitization.
164
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 73 (6th ed. 2003) (analogizing the trust to
unitization). The trust developed as a way to ease interactions among holders of present and future interests. A
trustee holds legal title in the full fee simple interest while beneficiaries of the trust hold equitable versions of
standard property interests, such as life estates and remainders. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at
295-97. In an urban area, a trust-like structure might be employed to nest physically smaller equitable holdings
within larger legal ownership.
165
See, e.g., Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time?: Business Improvement Districts and Urban
Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365 (1999). Although BIDs allow proximate owners to impose taxes on
themselves and to spend the revenues pursuing shared goals, they do not have a formalized system in place for
splitting up the benefits that are thereby realized.
166
Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75 (1998) (proposing
BLIDs).
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provide a different set of incentives for cooperation. The fact that anyone
might later end up in another spatial position within the community gives
everyone at least a limited stake in the fate of all portions of the community.
This is a synthetic entwining of ownership interests that replicates in some
measure the scattered strips of the semicommons, which similarly blurred
ownership lines and helped to align incentives.167 Other opportunities for
both cooperation and conflict would arise for floating fee owners when land
is reallocated. Finding an appropriate algorithm for collecting and
prioritizing preferences is no easy matter, as disputes over mundane types
of portable claims—office space in a new building, for example—attests.168
At the same time, however, the floating fee offers the capacity for
collaboration directed at maximizing the joint returns from a given
reconfiguration.
Finally, callable or floating fees might interact in interesting ways with
other land use innovations that have been discussed in recent years. To take
one example that I have focused on previous work, a shared equity or
reduced risk form of homeownership might mesh well with a callable or
floating fee if the latter structures offered more predictable time windows
for settling up with investors over gains and losses.169 One of the difficulties
associated with offloading housing market risk onto investors is that the
expected returns depend on how long the owner holds onto the property—
and this is unpredictable.170 If property became vulnerable to calls or
reconfigurations at predictable intervals, those intervals could provide
natural points for payouts to investors (if area home values have gone up) or
payments to homeowners (if area home values have gone down).
The potential for a new homeownership form to buffer investment
losses and truncate investment gains would also interact with incentives
surrounding the exercise of calls or reconfigurations, with the specific
effects depending on the compensation protocols in place. A combination
of investment protection against market fluctuations and incentives to meet
governmentally established metrics in order to retain possession could work
an interesting change in the way that people think about ownership. These
changes might, for example, invert NIMBYism. In place of risk-averse
167
See Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
131–69 (2000). A similar approach, which might be used more broadly, would synthetically interlock the
holdings of individual owners through the use of derivative instruments keyed to neighboring owners’ property
values, stock prices, or other economic variables. Again, the goal would be to make each owner share to a greater
extent in the fortunes of her neighbors.
168
RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING 270-76 (2015) (describing the office-allocation difficulties
associated with the Booth School of Business’s move to a new building).
169
For background on existing models, see Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
1047, 1063-70 (2008) and sources cited therein.
170
See, e.g., Andrew Caplin et al., Shared-Equity Mortgages, Housing Affordability, and Homeownership,18
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 209, 219 (2007) (“The long and unpredictable nature of the payoff period appears to
have been the chief reason that the Bank of Scotland withdrew its shared-equity mortgages from the market”).
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homeowners who reflexively fight all change to protect resale values, a new
style of owners might be willing to take positive expected-value bets with
respect to development in order to earn the right to remain.171
III. OBJECTIONS
Any suggested change in existing property forms might be expected to
produce strong resistance. Property is an inherently conservative institution
that is designed to entrench claims and protect expectations, not upend
them. Yet property cannot work without some degree of dynamism.172
Property thus illustrates well Lon Fuller’s point that a foundational social
design challenge is “that of maintaining a balance between supportive
structure and adaptive fluidity.”173 The premise of this paper is that our
existing property forms are long on supportive structure but too short on
adaptive fluidity, and that recalibration is warranted.
This Part anticipates several objections. I start by addressing the
standard question of how any idea can be a good one if it has not already
been implemented. I then turn to a set of theoretical concerns associated
with altering property forms in the ways suggested here, including the
worry that the resulting arrangement is too weak to count as property or
runs afoul of the numerus clausus principle. Finally, I consider a primary
normative objection to making property less rooted or permanent—that it
will result in harmful forms of displacement and associated identity loss for
people and communities.
A. Why Don’t We See It?
A standard response to any proposed innovation in property (or any
other area of the law) runs like this: If this were such a good idea, wouldn’t
private parties already be clamoring to adopt it on their own? Doesn’t the
fact that we don’t observe it in the real world establish its lack of value?
As an initial matter, it is worth reiterating that we do see models that
involve time limited or floating estates already, both in the U.S. and in other
countries—from vacation timeshares to retirement homes to land
readjustment to all manner of usufructs. Eminent domain provides us with a
171
Such a result would fit with behavioral findings suggesting that people are loss averse rather than
uniformly risk averse, and more willing take risks to avoid a result that would be framed as a loss than to obtain a
result that would be framed as a gain. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39
AM. PSYCHOL. 341, 342-43 (1984).
172
See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 28 (rev. ed. 1964) (describing the tension between stability
and dynamism in contract and property, in which too little stability presents the risk that “exchange would lose its
anchorage,” while too much rigidity means that “society’s effort to direct its resources toward their most effective
use is frustrated by a system of vested personal and institutional interests”).
173
Id. at 29.
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callable fee as well, if a much maligned one. The question, then, is not
whether there is demand for these kinds of alternatives—clearly there is—
but rather why private innovation has not produced more comprehensive
versions of them that could generate solutions to urban land use challenges.
There are at least three reasons we might see this shortfall, other than
intrinsic lack of merit.
First, private parties may have difficulty introducing a new way of
holding property without the imprimatur of government. It is not just a
matter of getting potential buyers to accept the new form, but also lenders
and loan guarantors who are wedded to standardized forms.
Second, the options retained by a private party would be close to
valueless unless the local government was willing to approve—and commit
itself in advance to approving—the larger scale projects that would be made
possible by the option’s exercise. Likewise, the private party would be
gambling on the government not undertaking some protective measure that
would prevent exercise of the options against the current wishes of the
possessory owners.174
Third, some of the places where callable and floating fees would be
most valuable are places in which ownership is presently dispersed among
many owners. Government involvement would likely be necessary to
consolidate ownership in such places before a private party would be in a
position to experiment with the approaches discussed here. But a developer
would be unlikely to win that form of government intervention based on a
possible future development project that the developer now only wishes to
amass options on exercising.
To be sure, these points only cast doubt on the claim that the
nonexistence of these property forms indicates their lack of value. They do
not establish the opposite proposition: that positive value could be derived
from these innovations. And one might argue that these arguments prove
too much. If it is really the case that uncertainty about future government
actions helps to explain private reluctance to initiate these forms, wouldn’t
the same uncertainty operate to quash private participation even under a
governmentally-sponsored system of callable or floating fees? Because the
government cannot legally bind itself not to act in certain ways in the
future, what would keep it from bowing to political pressure and unwinding
the limited fees (to the detriment of the option holders) once the possessory
owners had ensconced themselves in their properties?175
174
Such a move to eliminate bargained-for value might or might not amount to a compensable taking.
Compare Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) with Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (reaching different results when statutes regulating coal mining effectively
eliminated the value associated with the “support estate” recognized by Pennsylvania law).
175
Cf. Donald Clarke, China’s Stealth Urban Land Revolution, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 323, 352-58 (2014)
(assessing the potential for political action to turn time-limited, renewable urban land use rights in China into
perpetual ones).
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There are a couple of responses. For one thing, granting actual property
interests to third parties is a form of precommitment that is harder to undo,
at least to the extent that it creates interests that, if eliminated, would be
compensable takings. A better answer is that a government that plans ahead
to create these limited fees is likely to face lower political barriers in
allowing the already conveyed interests to play out as planned than it would
in initiating eminent domain anew. This does not mean that local
governments might not unwind these interests under some circumstances,
only that the ability to facilitate economic redevelopment through inaction
could be a valuable asset for governmental entities faced with increasing
economic pressures. Moreover, local governments would be in a position to
incentivize initial developer participation in these approaches, generating
momentum and credibility for the approach in a way that would be difficult
to replicate privately.
In short, the problems that I identify with existing property forms are
not amenable to ordinary market solutions. For one thing, land use markets
are not ordinary markets; instead, they are highly regulated arenas in which
the rights to engage in uses are not objects of commerce but rather the
subjects of complex political negotiations. Equally significant, the turnover
in individual neighboring properties is not synchronized in a way that would
enable large-scale changes in use. Land assembly can be accomplished
through eminent domain, but eminent domain is not a market solution.
Of course, private parties can attempt to amass large assemblages of
land on their own, using buying agents and the like to get around holdout
problems.176 But even when this strategy is successful, it concentrates
ownership in a way that can generate normative concerns. And there can be
inefficiencies associated with consolidating ownership for all purposes at a
scale much larger than that which is best suited to the ordinary valuegenerating activities taking place on the property. Doing so solves one set of
problems (managing the coordination among separate owners) at the cost of
introducing another set of problems (managing the internal interactions
among different agents, such as employees or tenants).177
What is unique about the approach here, and what requires the
coordinating involvement of government, is the possibility of repeatedly
assembling and reassembling the most valuable complementary land uses—
all without the need to continually maintain the entire operation under a
single owner’s control.

See Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain: A Rationale Based on Secret
Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 18–24 (2006).
177
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
176
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B. Property Gone Wrong?
The next set of objections sounds in property theory and asks whether
the approaches suggested here would move us away from what property is
foundationally meant to be and do. First I address the question of whether
the limited estates discussed here would fatally weaken property. Second, I
consider whether the numerus clausus principle ought to be regarded as an
impediment to these sorts of innovations.
1. Too Weak?
The analysis above explained why a tenure form that moved away from
the FS’s particular architecture would not cease to be property. But would
such a form of property be too weak to be attractive to anyone? To answer
the question, we must compare it not to an idealized version of property but
to the FS as it operates on the ground and as it might be adapted to urban
conditions going forward.
In terms of protecting the option to stay in place, the stalwart FS is only
as strong as the current political resistance to the application of eminent
domain.178 We do not have a property form that guarantees the right to stay
in place forever.179 Yet even a strong right to stay in the same physical
location indefinitely does little to protect what gives property most of its
value—its position relative to other uses. What will happen (or fail to
happen) nearby remains a gamble, no matter how strong the right to
remain.180 Property rights may well be more valuable in a system that is
good at putting complementary uses together, even at some displacement
risk.
Remaking the tenure form may also give the average citizen property
rights that are stronger than they would be likely to enjoy under alternative
models. For example, expanding the scope of holdings under one owner’s
control can harness synergies among uses without upending the FS.181 But
178
This statement assumes that politics, not constitutional doctrine, provide the binding constraint against
the use of eminent domain to reconfigure property in urban areas. See text accompanying supra note 107.
179
It might seem that owners who keep their properties in high-value uses would be largely immune to
eminent domain. This might be generally true as a political matter, but it remains contingent for that same reason.
Even if we assume that condemning authorities can unfailingly recognize and protect efficient uses on the merits,
the fact that a given owner’s use is high-value for the current parcel size does not mean that another use at a
different scale might not generate more value. Similarly, even if the owner’s current use is optimal, it might be
embedded within an area that contains many suboptimal uses; eminent domain might target the area as a whole.
See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (nonblighted store can be condemned along with blighted neighboring
properties in order to redevelop the entire area).
180
See STRETTON, supra note 11, at 39 (explaining that within large, complex cities, the location choice of a
firm or household “consists chiefly in guessing at other people’s future locational and investment decisions” and
is thus “chiefly a gamble on other people’s externalities”) (emphasis in original).
181
For example, Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman have proposed an approach modeled on the one
that shopping malls use to manage asymmetric spillovers among anchor stores and smaller stores, which is
premised on bringing a block of uses under single ownership. See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 64;
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such approaches rely on consolidating ownership in a smaller number of
hands. Most economic actors—that is, all those operating within the large
envelope of the single entity’s control—would hold diminished property
interests, such as leaseholds. And, not incidentally, achieving this
consolidated property form is likely to require some form of coercion-presumably eminent domain. Both leaseholds and eminent domain
temporally truncate property interests just as surely as would a fee interest
that expressly builds in that possibility.
Indeed, introducing limited tenure forms may be in some cases a less
invasive and more owner-protective move than applying more coercion to
an (ostensibly) fuller set of ownership rights. By clearly laying out
expectations, limited tenure forms align more closely with urban realities.
They thereby avoid the sort of jarring disconnect that eminent domain
produces between the rhetoric of unlimited property ownership and the
reality of coercive reconfiguration.
We might also understand limited fees as changing the nature of
coercion associated with private property.182 What makes property coercive
is not only the state-backed enforcement of exclusion from an individual
owner’s premises but property’s capacity to thwart larger-scale projects by
granting holdouts a veto power. A floating or callable fee can indeed have
the effect of coercively pushing individual owners out of the way of larger
projects, but it also frees owners as a group from the coercion of individual
owners. For similar reasons, we would not say that a unanimity requirement
is an inherently less coercive way to make decisions than a simple majority
or supermajority requirement. It is more protective of the status quo, to be
sure, but it grants tremendous power to each individual voter to lock the
status quo in place.183
2. Too Fancy?
No discussion of altered tenure forms can avoid confronting the
supposed barrier of the numerus clausus doctrine—the idea that property
should come in just a few standardized forms. Thomas Merrill and Henry
Smith famously argued that a limited property menu keeps information
costs low for all those who wish to transact over, or even just avoid

see also Fennell, supra note 64 (discussing and critiquing Parchomovksy & Siegelman’s approach).
182
As Eric Freyfogle has observed, a system of private property represents a form of mutual coercion. Eric
T. Freyfogle, A Good that Transcends: Culture Change and Our Common Home, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1415, 1424
(2015) (“[T]he private-property approach [to the tragedy of the commons] is merely a form of mutual coercion
mutually agreed upon, and not necessarily much different from overtly regulatory approaches.”).
183
For a classic discussion of the costs and benefits of different voting rules, see JAMES BUCHANAN &
GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 68-72 (1962) (examining the tradeoffs between decision costs
and the costs of a decision adverse to one’s interests as the threshold for decisionmaking changes).
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encroaching on, property.184 By contrast, allowing idiosyncratic or “fancy”
property interests will sow confusion, causing information costs to
skyrocket.185 Should a callable or floating fee be rejected for this reason?
There are two reasons for a negative answer, even if we assume the
merits of the information-cost arguments in favor of a limited menu of
property forms. First, Merrill and Smith’s approach seeks “optimal”
standardization, not maximum standardization.186 The asserted benefits
flowing from a fixed and limited tenure menu do not require that the menu
be limited (for all practical purposes) to only one form, much less that this
form equate to the FS.
Second, the callable and floating fee can be constructed without adding
materially to the existing property menu. The kinds of changes proposed in
this paper could be readily accomplished using varieties of defeasible
estates and executory interests—familiar entries in the current list of
property forms. For reasons similar to those that led to legislation
concerning common interest communities and conservation easements,
however, it would be advisable to legislatively define these new property
forms and give them standardized characteristics and terminology.
It is here that we see the more important point that might be taken from
the numerus clausus principle: the significance of providing a recognizable,
standardized form when introducing a novel type of property. Not only
does a standard template allow people to understand what they are getting
into, it also provides an anchor point for law and policy to coalesce
around.187 Conversely, a lack of consistency in terminology and operational
detail can produce confusion and impair uptake.188 None of this counsels
against property innovations, but it does suggest that care should go into the
way in which new forms are introduced.
Instructive in this regard is Pavel Pelikan’s analysis of organizational
structures for producing incentive systems. He identifies two types of errors
that such a structure might generate: “surviving errors” (incentive systems
that persist despite their flaws) and “absent successes” (experiments that
never occur or are rapidly stamped out despite their value).189 Applied to
systems for generating property forms, a closed list should make it easier to
184

Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus
Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).
185
See id. at 26-34.
186
See id. at 38-42.
187
See Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1607
(2008) (arguing that the limited property forms serve as regulatory platforms).
188
See, e.g., Ray W. Archer, Land Pooling by Local Government for Planned Urban Development, in LAND
READJUSTMENT 29, 39 (William A. Doebele, ed., 1982) (suggesting that such problems may explain in part why
Perth’s experiments in land pooling failed to thrive).
189
Pavel Pelikan, The Formation of Incentive Mechanisms in Different Economic Systems, in INCENTIVES
AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 27, 43-44 (Stefan Hedlund, ed., 1987). These error categories track the dichotomy
between “type 1” and “type 2” errors—false positive and false negatives—if the system is designed to identify
socially valuable arrangements.
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identify and eradicate problematic forms (“surviving errors”). But it would
also quash experimentation capable of generating useful new forms.190
To the extent that the numerus clausus principle is reflexively invoked
to shut down innovation in tenure forms,191 it represents an insidious
doctrine—one whose costs may go undetected because they mostly take the
form of “absent successes.” But at the same time, new forms must be
introduced in a way that enables them to survive long enough to take hold,
or they too will join the ranks of the absent successes.
C. Displacement and Identity Loss
A primary concern with recognizing explicitly callable or floating fees
is that these tenure forms would lead to more involuntary displacement. I
have written elsewhere about the significance of the possessory option—the
ability to remain in place if one so chooses.192 There is no way to extend an
option to other parties to end or change a household’s or firm’s tenure
without at the same time curtailing the possessory option that the owner
herself holds. The issue is not just one of individual owners being displaced,
though that is a large concern. Facilitating or accelerating change within a
community also presents risks to that community’s collective sense of
identity, which is shared among its residents.
There are at least two distinct ways that the new tenure forms sketched
here might interact with questions of displacement and identity. First, we
might wonder if these potential effects would make floating or callable fees
political nonstarters—either doomed from the beginning or subject to being
unwound once they are underway.193 Second is the possibility that these
property forms would heighten the vulnerability of the least politically
powerful groups to forced displacement. The concern here would not be
that these new property forms would prove politically impossible, but rather
that they would prove all too politically possible—with unwanted results.
I will start by dispensing with two arguments that might seem to moot
190
Pelikan’s analysis focuses on the role of “tacit knowledge” in minimizing both kinds of errors. See id. at
33-50. Experimentation at the local government level offers an alternative to more centralized methods of control
that might be better able to make use of such dispersed knowledge. Moreover, in the present context, I have
suggested that some new property forms could themselves spur private experimentation into cooperative
structures—whether for managing change under a floating fee arrangement or banding together to forestall a call
under a callable fee arrangement.
191
To be clear, this need not be the import of the numerus clausus doctrine, and it is not what scholars like
Merrill and Smith are actually saying. One way of understanding the doctrine is procedural in nature, designed to
channel changes in tenure forms into legislatures rather than through courts. Another interpretation, suggested in
the text, is to focus on the significance of standardizing the forms that are introduced, not keeping them out.
192
See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Options for Owners and Outlaws, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. J. 239,
244-47 (2012).
193
This point was addressed in a general way above. See text accompanying note 175 supra. The severity of
the underlying displacement concerns, considered in this section, may bear on the likelihood of these political
impediments.
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concerns about displacement. First is the claim that displacement concerns
disappear when parties voluntarily opt into a given tenure form, as where a
currently undeveloped area is newly developed subject to the limited fee.
As with other “opt in” arrangements like common interest communities, we
may wonder whether parties fully recognize what they are getting into, and
ask how voluntary a choice really is if all of the available housing stock
within the most desirable areas comes with this proviso. This concern is
sharpened if the pricing of homes in different areas builds in displacement
risks, as it presumably would, since lower income people may face a
constrained choice set. While the opportunity to opt into different tenure
forms does make a normative difference, as I will explain, it does not
provide a complete answer to concerns about displacement.
Nor is the observation that everyone is already holding a callable fee by
virtue of their vulnerability to eminent domain a complete answer. While it
is relevant that vulnerability to displacement does already exist, we cannot
ignore the possibility that the introduction of more limited estates would
alter the character or distribution of that vulnerability in potentially
unwanted ways. Offering expressly callable or floating fees could also
sidestep the political resistance associated with the exercise of eminent
domain, which might lead to displacement occurring with greater
frequency.194 It would be inaccurate to suggest that this would introduce no
disadvantages relative to eminent domain for anyone.
We must, therefore, take displacement concerns seriously, both as a
potential threat to the viability of tenure innovations and as potential
normative objection to their success. Here it becomes relevant that
leaseholds that provide little to no long-term tenure protection are common
in most U.S. jurisdictions. Most residential leaseholds are for one year or
less, and the landlord typically has the right to raise the rent or withdraw the
unit at the end of the lease term, with either action carrying the potential to
displace the tenant. Compared with these typical leaseholds, a callable or
floating fee would appear to add tenure protection rather than erode it. To
the extent that these new tenure forms made ownership more affordable,
they could shift households from the relatively less secure tenure form of
leasing to a relatively more secure tenure form.
Significantly, however, some jurisdictions do tightly control the
displacement of leaseholders through rent control and similar measures. In
such places, it is not only the FS that can block reconfiguration, but also the
veto power that is assigned to tenants who are given a statutory right to
194
A similar criticism can be leveled against land assembly districts, an alternative to eminent domain
proposed in Heller & Hills, supra note 152. By design, these districts are meant to increase the amount of land
assembly by lowering political barriers. See generally id. Consequently, it is impossible to claim that the intradistrict coercion upon which the system relies will never operate to the disadvantage of landowners relative to the
baseline of eminent domain.
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remain indefinitely.195 Introducing a callable or floating fee into
jurisdictions where such rights exist would curtail not only the rights of
affected landlords but also those of their tenants.196 Such a result might
seem either politically untenable (given the political equilibrium that has
already produced such strong tenant protections) or normatively suspect
(because it would seem to unambiguously downgrade rather than upgrade
the prevailing level of tenure protection in the jurisdiction).
But the downgrading of tenure protection may not be as unambiguous as
it seems. If the status quo protections for existing tenants also tend to
restrict the supply of affordable housing in these jurisdictions, people may
be either pushed out of the jurisdiction or into less secure arrangements
(homelessness, staying with family and friends, and so on). The capacity to
reconfigure and repurpose property, possibly at higher densities, could add
to the overall housing stock for both tenants and buyers. Instead of
maximally protecting a subset of those who desire housing in the area and
offering nothing to the balance, a larger slate of housing choice might be
available to greater numbers of households.
Regardless of the empirical reality or the relative normative weighting
given to the interests of current and potential tenants,197 the political forces
generating tenant protections might nonetheless block any property
innovation that would have the effect of reducing protections for tenants.
An interesting question, then, is how and whether flexible tenure
arrangements could accommodate strong demands for tenure security. One
possibility would be to designate certain portions of an urban area for longterm residency while other areas were designated for callable or floating
fees. The result might be valuable sorting into more and less permanent
forms of property—just as investors can elect callable or call-protected
financial instruments. Even if more dispossessions occurred under this
approach, they might be channeled toward those who are least bothered by
them.198
Troublingly, however, such approaches might also seem to channel
dispossession toward those who are least able to pay the premium for
permanence. But this need not be the case. Call-protected tenancies might
195
This right is of course subject to eminent domain, but the political limits on that course of action may
remove much of the associated threat.
196
Absent an exception or override, curtailment in the landlord’s estate entails a curtailment in the tenant’s
estate as well; the landlord cannot lease out an interest greater than that which she herself holds. See, e.g., Henry
E. Smith, The Elements of Possession, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION 65, 91 (Yun-chien Chang,
ed., 2015) (describing the rule of nemo dat quod non habet which holds that “one cannot give that which one does
not have”).
197
See Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 355-71 (1986) (discussing
arguments for favoring tenants already present in the community through rent control).
198
Governments may already attempt to steer eminent domain away from those who will suffer the most, at
least if they are politically well-organized. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent
Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV.101, 110–21 (2006). But the callable fee would do so more consistently and openly.
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offer one way of distributing permanence to those who gain the most from
it, whether or not they can pay for it. Callable or floating fees might also be
spatially distributed in ways that would address equity concerns. It cannot
be ignored in this discussion that under the status quo, low income people
are generally more vulnerable to eminent domain, more likely to occupy
leaseholds rather than freeholds, and at greater risk for foreclosure. Simply
making that vulnerability to displacement more transparent, as the callable
and floating fees would do, would make it more politically salient and more
amenable to being addressed directly through law and policy.199
A related concern is that these new tenure forms would undervalue and
disrupt the deep connections that people form with land.200 There are
several responses. First, if people are heterogeneous in their connections to
land, they may be able to self-sort into more or less rooted and endless
estates. Second, some versions of the floating fee could actually increase the
security with which people would remain members of the same community,
even if not occupying precisely the same physical footprint.201 Third, it is an
open normative question whether society ought to encourage people to
make large emotional investments in remaining in precisely the same
physical location over time.202 People’s willingness to move for new job
opportunities, for example, can be economically valuable. Absolute
immobility may no longer even serve as a particularly good proxy for the
important goals of maintaining ties to family and social support networks.
Some degree of disruption may, indeed, be generative in breaking up
existing patterns and enabling more inclusive and vibrant communities.
Stability looks less attractive as a normative value when one realizes its role
in perpetuating existing residential patterns, including segregation. Drawing
floating fee zones that straddle boundary lines between racially identifiable
neighborhoods, for example, might shake up ordinary metrics of housing
search and produce greater prospects for integration.203 Callable fees could
likewise offer controlled opportunities to introduce perturbations in existing
housing and land use arrangements, which could powerfully disrupt self199
This might, for example, be an area in which the disparate impact cause of action under the Fair Housing
Act could offer traction. See Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (recognizing a disparate impact cause of action in the Fair Housing Act).
200
For an illuminating discussion of the connections between property and memory, see generally Eduardo
M. Peñalver, Property’s Memories, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1071 (2011).
201
This raises the issue of the scale at which rootedness should be assessed. See YI-FU TUAN, SPACE AND
PLACE 149-60 (1977) (emphasizing the role of scale in determining the meaning of one’s “homeland”); id. at 182
(“For nomads the cyclical exigencies of life yield a sense of place at two scales: the camps, and the far larger
territory within which they move.”).
202
The extent to which law and policy can shape people’s expectations surrounding property has been the
subject of some recent empirical work. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash & Stephanie M. Stern, Property Frames,
87 WASH. U. L. REV. 449, 479-84 (2010).
203
See Lee Anne Fennell, Searching for Fair Housing (unpublished draft dated October 2015). Cf. Aaron J.
Saiger, Local Government Without Tiebout, 41 URB. L. 93 (2009) (proposing periodic redrawing of local
government boundaries to thwart efforts to sort into exclusive, wealth-stratified communities). I am grateful to
Angela Onwuachi-Willig and Paul Gowder for discussions on this point.
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reinforcing patterns.204
Fostering an enduring sense of identity with particular places does
require that the built environment exhibit some degree of stability over
time.205 The costs of disposable property are evident.206 But keeping too
much of the past in place also impose costs—including stifling creativity. In
discussing historic preservation, Yi-Fu Tuan offers the arresting metaphor
of an individual who must decide what to keep and what to throw away to
survive in what threatens to become an increasingly cluttered home.207
Along similar lines, Edward Glaeser has suggested placing a budget on the
number of properties that can be historically preserved, which would keep a
stable fraction of the city open to redesign and redevelopment.208
Regardless of the tenure forms that communities choose to employ, they
cannot avoid confronting issues of urban permanence and change.
Heterogeneity in tenure alternatives offers one way to manage that tension.
Like museums that employ a mix of permanent and temporary exhibits,
cities might designate areas for more frequent remaking or relative
permanence.209 Doing so would offer a more flexible alternative than a hard
cap on the number of historic buildings, and one that would recognize
complementarities among adjacent properties.210
CONCLUSION
For centuries, the FS powerfully aligned incentives by extending
perpetual dominion over a specified physical domain. It proved versatile
enough to maintain its dominant position even as social and economic
conditions changed in profound ways. But a perpetual temporal reach tied
to specific geographic coordinates has shifted over time from a core source
204
See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 203 (examining the potential for random variation to disrupt segregative
patterns; Richard R.W. Brooks, The Banality of Racial Inequality (reviewing DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING
RACISM (2014), 124 YALE L.J. 2626, 2655-61 (2015) (explaining how introducing random variation into urnfilling protocols could break the entrenched pattern that is illustrated by the Polya urn model). Cf. Ken Kollman,
John H. Miller, & Scott E. Page, Political Institutions and Sorting in a Tiebout Model, 87 AM ECON REV. 977,
989 (1997) (describing how the introduction of random policy mutations in a multi-jurisdictional model can
facilitate a shift from a less valuable local optimum to a more valuable overall configuration).
205
TUAN, supra note 201, at 159 (discussing the significance of landmarks as “visible signs [that] serve to
enhance a people’s sense of identity; they encourage awareness of and loyalty to place.”).
206
See, e.g., Elisabeth Braw, Japan’s Disposable Home Culture Is an Environmental and Financial
Headache, THE GUARDIAN, May 2, 2014 (describing problems arising out of a culture of building homes to be
destroyed in less than 30 years). I thank David Schleicher for alerting me to this example.
207
TUAN, supra note 201, at 196-97.
208
See EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY 162 (suggesting that “in a city like New York, the
landmarks commission should have a fixed number of buildings, perhaps five thousand, that it may protect.”).
209
Cf. Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Balancing the Zoning Budget, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
81 (2011) (proposing that limits on growth implemented within a city be offset by increased rights to build
elsewhere in the city).
210
See Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic Preservation,
33 STAN. L. REV. 473, 507-08 (1981) (discussing the “tout ensemble” doctrine articulated in Maher v. City of
New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975)).
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of value to a real liability in urban areas. It is time to rethink what we want
from estates in land and to ask whether the FS can still deliver it.
What is needed now are property forms that can cope with the spatial
interdependence that characterizes life in and around cities. This paper has
attempted to convince readers of this fact. I have suggested some directions
in which property might develop if we could escape the gravitational pull of
the FS, but the discussion here has been intentionally short on operational
detail. I do not purport to have hit upon the best way, or ways, to revise
tenure forms for the city. What I hope to have done instead is put on the
agenda—or at least on the table for debate—the idea of revising some of the
most foundational attributes of the FS.
Property is a human invention,211 and one that we must reinvent as
conditions change. It is no longer enough for the law to protect an owner’s
domain and forestall overt land use conflicts, when the opportunity cost of
failing to put together complementary uses in valuable patterns looms ever
larger. We must loosen the grip of the rooted, everlasting estate on our
imaginations if we want to build cities that are flexible enough to flourish.
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See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971) (“Property rights serve human values.”).

